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Article 
 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND CHOICE  
OF LAW IN THE CLOUD 
DAMON C. ANDREWS* 
JOHN M. NEWMAN† 
ABSTRACT 
 Cloud computing has revolutionized how society interacts with, 
and via, technology.  Though some early detractors criticized the 
“cloud” as being nothing more than an empty industry buzzword, 
we contend that by dovetailing communications and calculating 
processes for the first time in history, cloud computing is—both 
practically and legally—a shift in prevailing paradigms.  As a 
practical matter, the cloud brings with it a previously undreamt-
of sense of location independence for both suppliers and consum-
ers.  And legally, the shift toward deploying computing ability as 
a service, rather than as a product, represents an evolution to a 
contractual foundation for interacting. 
 Already, substantive cloud-based disputes have erupted in a va-
riety of legal fields, including personal privacy, intellectual prop-
erty, and antitrust, to name a few.  Yet before courts can confront 
such issues, they must first address the two fundamental proce-
dural questions of a lawsuit that form the bases of this Article—
whether any law applies in the cloud, and, if so, which law ought 
to apply.  Drawing upon novel analyses of analogous Internet ju-
risprudence, as well as concepts borrowed from disciplines rang-
ing from economics to anthropology, this Article seeks to supply 
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answers to these questions.  To do so, we first identify a set of 
normative goals that jurisdictional and choice-of-law methodolo-
gies ought to achieve in the unique context of cloud computing.  
With these goals in mind, we then lay out structured analytical 
guidelines and suggested policy reforms to guide the continued 
development of jurisdiction and choice of law in the cloud. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
[A] time may come, and may not be far distant, when commercial 
aircraft will fly at altitudes so high that it would be unrealistic to 
consider them as being within the territorial limits of the United 
States or of any particular State while flying at such altitudes.1 
We have come a long way in the more than half-century since Grace v. 
MacArthur was decided.  Today, in record-setting fashion, even humans are 
surpassing commercial aircraft in altitude.2  And with the ever-increasing 
use of cellular and wireless technologies, data is now, more than ever, being 
sent through and stored in the airwaves—or clouds.3  A different type of 
“cloud,” however, has taken center stage in this new era of data transfer and 
storage: cloud computing.  Although a healthy debate surrounds its precise 
definition,4 cloud computing, put simply, is the ability of an end user to 
store and access remotely located files and services over a network by 
means of a smart phone, computer, tablet, or other networked device.5 
The advent of cloud computing brought with it myriad novel legal 
challenges pertaining to, inter alia, privacy concerns, intellectual property 
                                                          
 1. Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Ark. 1959). 
 2.  On October 14, 2012, Austrian Felix Baumgartner freefell 128,100 feet—more than 
twenty-four miles—to Earth from a space capsule.  John Tierney, 24 Miles, 4 Minutes and 834 
M.P.H., All in One Jump, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2012, at A15, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/15/us/felix-baumgartner-skydiving.html?_r=0.  The stunt was 
part of the Red Bull Stratos project to gather new data about the human body and test new materi-
als at extreme altitudes.  Id.  On his descent, Baumgartner achieved a maximum speed of 833.9 
miles per hour, or Mach 1.24.  Id. 
 3.  See Thomas W. Hazlett, Allocating Radio Spectrum for the “Mobile Data Tsunami,” 13 
ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 82, 82–84 (2012) (noting the “looming spectrum 
shortage” and spectrum “crowding” due to the proliferation of wireless data). 
 4.  As one commentator noted humorously, “[a]ttempting to define cloud computing can 
prove to be as elusive as attempting to capture a genuine cloud with one’s hands.”  David S. Barn-
hill, Note, Cloud Computing and Stored Communications: Another Look at Quon v. Arch Wire-
less, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (ANNUAL REVIEW) 621, 638 (2010); see also infra notes 54–55 and 
accompanying text (discussing the public’s misconceptions about cloud computing). 
 5.  William J. Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under the 
Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1202 (2010).  For a more detailed explanation of 
the origins and mechanics of cloud computing, see infra Part II.C. 
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rights, and antitrust violations.6  And as is common with new technologies, 
the continuing scientific development of cloud computing is outpacing its 
legal counterpart, at least for now.7  But as courts’ decisions regarding the 
substantive law of cloud computing attempt to keep stride with the underly-
ing technology,8 critical procedural questions can sometimes be over-
looked.9  This Article grapples with the two fundamental questions of pro-
cedure—where personal jurisdiction is proper and what law governs a 
dispute—and endeavors to provide structured frameworks for analyzing 
them.  The answer to these questions can oftentimes exert an even greater 
influence over a lawsuit’s outcome than its substantive merits,10 for equally 
as important as what the law says is which law applies, and where it does 
so.11 
To illustrate the intersection of cloud technology and the law, imagine 
a manmade floating island, anchored at sea or in a river, upon which com-
puter servers are aggregated.  The buoyant structure can be moved about the 
body of water as needed—for example, to provide computer and telecom-
munications support to an area affected by a natural disaster—and the serv-
ers are powered and cooled by the motion (wave, tidal, or current) of the 
water in which the structure floats.  Too futuristic or unrealistic?  Not for 
                                                          
 6.  See infra notes 81–83 (providing examples of cases in which cloud-based computing is-
sues were litigated). 
 7.  See Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules 
Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553, 566 (1998) (“[T]hat technological developments out-
pace the rate of legal change poses another particular problem for intellectual property rights; the 
law always lags behind the technology.”); see also Edward Lee, Rules and Standards for Cyber-
space, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1318 (2002) (“The Internet is fast developing and contin-
ues to outpace the law.”). 
 8.  See Lee, supra note 7, at 1318 (describing the challenges courts confront in resolving 
cases presenting issues with regard to cyberspace).   
 9.  See Lorelei Ritchie, Reconciling Contract Doctrine with Intellectual Property Law: An 
Interdisciplinary Solution, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 105, 106 (2008) 
(“Certainly, when intellectual property disputes touch on other disciplines, such as civil proce-
dure . . . courts have tended to overlook their synergies, focusing instead on only one of several 
important policies or principles.  The result has gone beyond missed opportunities.  It has led to 
judicial mistakes . . . .”). 
 10.  See, e.g., Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of Law in Action, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 719, 745 & n.130 (2009) (“Which state’s law applies can determine the litiga-
tion outcome.”). 
 11.  See Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice-of-Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 949, 992–93 (1994) (“[C]ourts recognize that procedural requirements perform an essential 
function in any legal system . . . .  Hence, substance is not all; courts and administrators recognize 
that substantive results must be balanced against the harm to the system that would result if proce-
dures were entirely ignored.”). 
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technology behemoth Google, Inc., which was granted a patent for such a 
data center in 2009.12 
In industry terms, Google’s patent describes a mobile, marine-based 
server farm.13  The advantages of such a server farm include, among others, 
a zero-cost power supply and the ability to move the servers within close 
proximity of the end users who interact with them.14  In addition to these 
economic and functional considerations, however, there are substantial legal 
consequences to this arrangement.  For example, a server farm that is locat-
ed both everywhere and nowhere, essentially,15 allows users to conduct 
network activities that might otherwise be regulated heavily—or even pro-
hibited—by the national laws of the country where a land-based server is 
located.16 
Query, then, if a lawsuit were to arise based on content hosted by a 
marine-based server like the one described in Google’s patent, where would 
jurisdiction be proper?  In Delaware, where Google is incorporated?  In 
California, where Google has its principal place of business?  Or else-
where?  And equally as important, if a court can hear the case, what law 
governs?  To the extent that these questions remain unanswered, they are 
especially troubling because cloud-computing service providers often retain 
copies of uploaded content in multiple locations or, at the opposite end of 
spectrum, fragment data across numerous servers.17 
This Article seeks to answer these questions.  Part II traces the history 
of data storage and data transfer prior to the dawn of cloud computing, with 
particular emphases on content reproduction, communication technology, 
                                                          
 12.  Water-Based Data Center, U.S. Patent No. 7,525,207 (filed Feb. 26, 2007) (issued Apr. 
28, 2009); Ashlee Vance, Google’s Search Goes Out to Sea, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Sept. 7, 
2008, 9:59 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/googles-search-goes-out-to-sea/. 
 13.  See Steven R. Swanson, Google Sets Sail: Ocean-Based Server Farms and International 
Law, 43 CONN. L. REV. 709, 714 (2011) (“[A] server is a computer designed to provide infor-
mation or processes to other computers on a network, and a server farm, also known as a data cen-
ter, is a group of servers in one location connected by a network.”).   
 14.  See id. at 716–17. 
 15.  See Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462 (D. Mass. 1997) 
(“The Internet has no territorial boundaries.  To paraphrase Gertrude Stein, as far as the Internet is 
concerned, not only is there perhaps ‘no there there,’ the ‘there’ is everywhere where there is In-
ternet access.”). 
 16.  See Swanson, supra note 13, at 718 (noting, in particular, that “[g]ambling or pornogra-
phy websites could . . . escape scrutiny by running floating sites” and highlighting some countries’ 
laws that ban certain Internet activities). 
 17.  Josiah Dykstra & Damien Riehl, Forensic Collection of Evidence from Infrastructure-as-
a-Service Cloud Computing, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 10 (2012). 
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and computing capability;18 it also provides a technological overview of 
cloud computing and the legal contours in which it exists.19  Part III then 
summarizes personal-jurisdiction and choice-of-law jurisprudence.20  Part 
III also sets forth the normative goals that this Article seeks to achieve by 
evaluating the interplay between predictability and innovation and discuss-
ing the economic impacts of new technologies.21 
Parts IV and V then lay out frameworks for analyzing personal juris-
diction and choice of law in cloud-computing cases.  These Parts each begin 
by examining decisions from Internet-era cases and demonstrating that 
cloud computing presents issues of personal jurisdiction and choice of law 
that are distinct from cases involving regular Internet interactions, that is, 
operating or accessing a website.22  By recognizing this contrast, Parts IV 
and V explain the reasons why the Internet-law approach to personal juris-
diction and choice of law is not only legally incongruous with cloud com-
puting, but also unworkable in practice.  Parts IV and V then offer a series 
of solutions—both judicial and legislative—for addressing these cloud-
computing conundrums in personal jurisdiction and choice of law.23 
Finally, Part VI offers a brief conclusion.  In sum, this Article exposes 
the hazards of attempting to apply traditional personal-jurisdiction and 
choice-of-law doctrines to novel situations that arise in cloud-computing 
interactions.  By acknowledging the need to depart from these conventional 
frameworks, this Article offers solutions that accommodate the recent de-
velopments in technology and illuminate a path for courts and legislatures 
to follow when addressing the intricacies raised by these two fundamental 
procedural questions. 
II.  FROM COURIER TO CLOUD: THE EVOLUTION AND CONVERGENCE OF 
COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTING 
The central thesis of what follows is simple.  Prior to the advent of 
cloud computing, humankind’s ability to communicate and to calculate (and 
later to compute) developed on separate tracks.  The shift to the cloud is the 
bridging of that millennia-old gap.  In short, cloud computing constitutes 
the first dovetailing of communication and calculation.  Thus, we contend 
                                                          
 18.  See infra Part II.A–B. 
 19.  See infra Part II.C. 
 20.  See infra Part III.A–B. 
 21.  See infra Part III.B.4. 
 22.  See infra Parts IV.A, V.A. 
 23.  See infra Parts IV.B, V.B. 
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that the advent of cloud computing represents a true paradigm shift24 in the 
way that both suppliers and consumers interact with digital technology—it 
is a shift away from viewing computing capability as a product and toward 
deploying and consuming it as a service. 
As with any disruptive leap forward in technology that ultimately al-
ters real-space behavior, the move to the cloud carries with it implications 
for the administration of legal systems and the application of existing 
laws.25  The first step toward exploring those implications is gaining an un-
derstanding of the technology itself; accordingly, this Part begins by re-
counting the developments in information technology that paved the way 
for cloud computing.  We turn first to what we term the “Pre-Network 
Era”—a period that spans the roughly seven-and-a-half millennia predating 
the rise of the Internet. 
A.  The Pre-Network Era 
The marketplace transactions, political structures, and legal mecha-
nisms of ancient civilizations eventually grew too complex to manage using 
only human memory and oral communication.  Innovations provided the 
means to overcome these limitations—as to communicative data storage 
and transfer, writing emerged; as to calculating ability, the abacus was de-
veloped.  Yet, from the earliest symbols etched into clay pottery or cave 
walls26 to the first books printed more than six millennia later using Guten-
berg’s movable-type printing press27 to the millions of copies of mass-
market hardcover and paperback books still being printed today, content 
storage and transfer occurred within remarkably static structures.  Commu-
nication technology also marginally improved but, overall, remained fairly 
                                                          
 24.  The term “paradigm shift” originated in Thomas Kuhn’s seminal work The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions.  Kuhn employed it to describe a dramatic change in the prevailing theory 
underlying a field of scientific study.  THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS 84–85 (2d ed. 1970).  It has subsequently entered the popular lexicon as a phrase 
more loosely describing any major change in political, social, artistic, or commercial structures, 
and it is in this latter sense that we use the term here. 
 25.  See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 26.  See David Whitehouse, ‘Earliest Writing’ Found, BBCNEWS (May 4, 1999), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/334517.stm (“The first known examples of writing may 
have been unearthed at an archaeological dig in Pakistan. . . .  [T]hese primitive inscriptions found 
on pottery may pre-date all other known writing.”). 
 27.  This press, it should be noted, may or may not have been the first movable-type press, 
and those “first books” may or may not have been Bibles—a healthy historical debate surrounds 
such claims, thankfully one far beyond the scope of this paper.  See, e.g., PETER L. 
SHILLINGSBURG, FROM GUTENBERG TO GOOGLE: ELECTRONIC REPRESENTATIONS OF LITERARY 
TEXTS 28 (2006). 
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static.  Similarly, calculating (and later computing) remained—in at least 
some ways—a relatively stable technology from 2000 B.C. to the late twen-
tieth century. 
As to content, the most readily apparent counterargument to our thesis 
is that the Gutenberg Press radically changed reproduction, distribution, and 
consumption.  It is certainly true that by greatly reducing variable costs, the 
invention of the printing press dramatically altered the economics of textual 
production.28  Thus, where “there were perhaps 30,000 books in all of Eu-
rope before Gutenberg printed his Bible; less than 50 years later, there were 
as many as 10 to 12 million books.”29  But even as it evolved from scratch-
ing in clay pots to using quill pens and vellum to printing multiple sheets 
from a single page of movable type, authorship and reproduction through-
out most of human history consisted of physically fixing data in “a tangible 
medium of expression,” to borrow a phrase from modern U.S. copyright 
law.30  And “tangible” meant media that were physical.  The movable-type 
press made books inexpensive to reproduce, but it did not eliminate condi-
tions of scarcity.31  It allowed a single operator to create hundreds of copies 
of texts, but it did not change the localized, physical nature of 
(re)production.32  It made printed materials more affordable, but did nothing 
transformative to distribution; that is, the end products still had to travel via 
the exact same real-space channels as handmade copies.33  Finally, end us-
ers consumed and stored data produced by the Gutenberg Press just as they 
had for thousands of years; the only difference was that exponentially more 
of them were able to do so. 
Even the digitization of content in the twentieth century did not, by it-
self, bring much structural change to production, distribution, and consump-
tion.  Before digital computers were networked, their ability to produce 
thousands of perfect copies at marginal costs approaching zero was super-
                                                          
 28.  See Jeremiah Dittmar, Information Technology and Economic Change: The Impact of the 
Printing Press, 126 Q. J. ECON. 1133, 1140 (2011) (comparing the benefits derived from the in-
vention of the printing press in cities with and without printing presses).  
 29.  Gutenberg’s Legacy, HARRY RANSOM CTR., UNIV. OF TEX., 
http://www.hrc.utexas.edu/educator/modules/gutenberg/books/legacy/ (last visited May 30, 2013). 
 30.  17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 31.  See Dittmar, supra note 28, at 1140 (describing the limitations to obtaining print media in 
cities that did not have printing presses).   
 32.  See id. (explaining that “[p]rint media were costly to transport because they were heavy 
and fragile commodities”). 
 33.  See LUCIAN FEBVRE & HENRI-JEAN MARTIN, THE COMING OF THE BOOK 115–17 (Geof-
frey Nowel-Smith & David Wootton, eds., 1976) (discussing the importance to early publishers of 
being located along established trade routes). 
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fluous.34  An individual in her own home could produce localized copies of 
content, but had no use for the surplus.35  This was so because distribu-
tion—as it had been following the introduction of the Gutenberg Press—
remained largely unchanged.  And as a result, consumption structures and 
processes remained relatively static as well. 
A somewhat stronger counterargument could be made as to communi-
cations technology.  Here, the focal points would likely be the emergence of 
pre-digital networks like the telegraph or analog telephone systems or, al-
ternatively, the development of wireless broadcast (or wired narrowcast) 
systems.  By alleviating at least some of the geographic–locality limitations 
on human communications, these developments were indeed innovative.36  
Yet again, we argue that these were—as a structural matter—less revolu-
tionary than they might seem at first glance.  These systems were beset by 
one of the same fundamental problems as face-to-face communication: en-
gaging in two- or multiple-way communications dictated a relatively lim-
ited number of participants; as that number expanded, communication nec-
essarily became one-way.37  Put another way, in a real-space, localized 
setting, a multiple-way conversation can only occur between a very limited 
number of participants.  Expanding this number soon requires changing the 
format to a one-way communication from an active speaker to a passive au-
dience.  And the advent of telegraphs, telephones, and wireless broadcast 
radio and television did nothing to change that. 
As to computing, our claim that the digital computer in some ways 
represented little change from the abacus might seem downright heretical.38  
Admittedly, the digital computer has represented a quantum leap forward in 
calculating ability—and the subsequent exponential growth in processing 
                                                          
 34.  See John M. Newman, Copyright Freeconomics, 66 VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) 
(manuscript at 11), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2138409 (“The intangibility of code, coupled with years of exponential 
growth in processing speeds and hard drive capacity, allowed for nearly instantaneous, high-
quality copying that entailed marginal costs approaching zero.”). 
 35.  Id. at 11–12.   
 36.  See generally Cory Ondrejka, Collapsing Geography: Second Life, Innovation, and the 
Future of National Power, 2 INNOVATIONS 27 (2007) (discussing the interplay between innova-
tion and geography). 
 37.  See id. 
 38.  Cf., e.g., Rocco L. Martino, Innovation and Economic Growth: Lessons from the Story of 
ENIAC, FOOTNOTES (Foreign Policy Research Institute), Apr. 2009, at 1, available at 
https://www.fpri.org/docs/FN1406-martino-eniac.pdf (describing the advent of the “Electronic 
Numerical Integrator and Computer” as a symbol of “radical, incremental, and revolutionary in-
novations . . . the grandfather of the computer and of the information transformation of our 
world”). 
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capability shows no signs of slowing.39  But, until very recently, humans 
interacted with computing devices much as they had with earlier calcula-
tors.  Computing was a localized process—a user needed to physically and 
locally interact with the machine that would perform the processes she in-
put.40  And consumers of computing power generally were required to pur-
chase physical machines.  In short, computing was viewed as a product, ra-
ther than a service.  All of this meant that digital computers were 
structurally quite similar to pre-digital calculating devices. 
Certainly, the advances mentioned above that emerged during the Pre-
Network Era brought with them great upheavals in social, economic, politi-
cal, and legal processes.  They were disruptive innovations in every sense 
of the word; they wreaked the sort of “creative destruction” upon en-
trenched markets that Schumpeter famously identified.41  But in recent dec-
ades, we have been—and are currently—experiencing paradigm shifts in 
content economics, communications technology, and computing capability 
that rival in magnitude the sum of innovative activity from the last seven-
and-a-half millenia combined. 
B.  The Internet: A Network of Networks 
The Internet—a “network of networks” and the “printing press of the 
technology era”42—provided the communication platform upon which con-
tent digitization and increasing computing capability could interact in a tru-
ly revolutionary way.  Widespread access to the Internet at constantly in-
creasing speeds did to data distribution what digitization and access to 
personal computers had done to reproduction: it lowered marginal costs to 
                                                          
 39.  “Moore’s Law” was coined to describe the rapid pace of growth in processing capability 
over the previous two decades.  INTEL, MOORE’S LAW (2005), 
ftp://download.intel.com/sites/channel/museum/Moores_Law/Printed_Materials/Moores_Law_2p
g.pdf (“Nearly 40 years ago, Intel co-founder Gordon Moore forecasted the rapid pace of technol-
ogy innovation.”). 
 40.  See David Lametti, The Cloud: Boundless Digital Potential or Enclosure 3.0?, 17 VA. 
J.L. & TECH. 190, 209 (2012) (“[A] user of traditional word-processing software such as Word or 
an email application such as Outlook runs these programs off her own machine, using local pro-
cessing power and data storage facilities.”). 
 41.  JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 (Harper & 
Row 3d ed. 1950) (1942) (describing innovations that “incessantly revolutionize[] the economic 
structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one”). 
 42.  Joshua C. Ramo & David S. Jackson, Winner Take All, TIME, Sept. 16, 1996, at 56, 63 
(quoting James Barksdale, President and CEO of Netscape). 
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essentially zero.43  The importance of the dawn of the Network Era for con-
tent, communication, and now computing, cannot be overstated.44 
Without connectivity, advances in computing were fairly irrelevant to 
the structural processes in place for the production, distribution, and con-
sumption of communicative content.  Before the Network Era, a single end 
user could feasibly have created millions of copies of an ebook on her home 
computer, but the duplicates would have been relegated to isolated storage 
as wasted surplusage.45  Firms and individuals were able to create content 
digitally—for example, newspaper reporters were able to write articles us-
ing word-processing programs—but distribution either required slow, costly 
physical means or was shackled by the limitations of broad- or narrowcast-
ing discussed above.46 
But networking not only represented a drastic reduction in the costs of 
communication, it also eliminated the relevance of geographic location to 
distribution capability and costs.  By removing the physical element from 
reproduction and distribution, it upended the old localized model such that 
content could be made available to anyone, anywhere, and could be distrib-
uted to them at the speed of light.47  For the first time, not only ideas them-
selves, but now their embodiments as well, were truly nonrivalrous.  Con-
tent abundance replaced content scarcity.48 
Finally, the adoption of the Internet deconstructed the hierarchy of 
production.  In place of top-down models arose end-to-end architecture that 
rendered the traditional concept of “end users” an oxymoron.49  Former 
                                                          
 43.  Cf. John M. Newman, Anticompetitive Product Design in the New Economy, 39 FLA. ST. 
U. L. REV. 681, 694 (2012) (“Digital products can be reproduced extremely cheaply, often with 
marginal costs approaching zero.”). 
 44.  See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, The Changing Patterns of Internet Usage, 63 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 67, 68 (2010) (“The Internet unquestionably represents one of the most important technologi-
cal developments in recent history.  It has revolutionized the way people communicate with one 
another and obtain information and has created an unimaginable variety of commercial and leisure 
activities.”). 
 45.  See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.   
 46.  See supra text accompanying note 37. 
 47.  Cf. Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1013, 1074–75 (2008) (highlighting the legal challenges resulting from globalization, which 
include “the complexities of gathering intelligence from telephone and internet communications 
transmitted in and out of the United States and around the world at the speed of light”). 
 48.  See Ellen P. Goodman & Anne H. Chen, Modeling Policy for New Public Service Media 
Networks, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 111, 153 (2010) (referring to “the world of content abun-
dance”). 
 49.  LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 8 (2004). 
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pure consumers became producers and distributors as well.50  And the rise 
of nearly instantaneous, zero-cost, two-way transfer of media created an av-
enue and demand for multipath, large-scale communication.51  The ability 
to effectively converse with thousands of individuals allowed previously 
undreamt-of communicative possibilities.  A single person’s blog posting 
could create a conversation that spread throughout a network of networks, 
seemingly with a life of its own—as the neologism aptly puts it, “virally.” 
The transformative shift to the Network Era has not been an easy one.  
In its infant stages, legal and political battles erupted over the application of 
standing laws and norms to the human interactions occurring atop this new 
platform.52  Myriad questions regarding ownership, agreements, morality, 
intellectual property, privacy, and other issues remain unresolved.53  And 
the next stage of development, described below, will raise yet even more 
questions in need of answers. 
C.  Rising into the Cloud 
The American public remains largely ignorant as to what, exactly, 
“cloud computing” is.  A majority, in fact, appear to believe it has some-
thing to do with actual clouds and that, consequently, a severe squall or 
thunderstorm could fatally disrupt cloud-computing processes.54  Given the 
difficulty that even industry experts have in formulating a precise definition 
                                                          
 50.  See Yafit Lev-Aretz, Second Level Agreements, 45 AKRON L. REV. 137, 141 (2012) 
(“Web 2.0 was defined as an ‘amalgam of ‘participatory Web’ applications,’ which turned erst-
while passive end users into active producers by allowing them to generate and share content of 
all types.”). 
 51.  Id. at 141–42 (explaining that the “decentralization of the Web . . . empowered the Inter-
net to operate as a platform rather than a mere data conduit,” leading to the advent of widespread 
sharing services such as “blogs, wikis, [and other social media websites]”). 
 52.  See, e.g., Bryce A. Lenox, Note, Personal Jurisdiction in Cyberspace: Teaching the 
Stream of Commerce Dog New Internet Tricks: Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th 
Cir. 1996), 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 331, 332 (1997) ( “Because of the youth and novelty of the 
Internet, jurisdictional issues are only now beginning to surface in the courts.”). 
 53.  Cf., e.g., Amelia Rawls, Contract Formation in an Internet Age, 10 COLUM. SCI. & 
TECH. L. REV. 200, 204 (2009) (discussing how, in particular, “modernity has induced transfor-
mations even in seemingly traditional applications of contract law”).  But see Lenox, supra note 
52, at 331–32 (stating that some “cyber-issues,” including “pornography on the Internet, copyright 
law, and libel have been addressed in great detail”).  
 54.  Zach Walton, Americans Think Cloud Computing Comes from Actual Clouds, 
WEBPRONEWS (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.webpronews.com/americans-think-cloud-computing-
comes-from-actual-clouds-2012-08 (discussing the results of a survey of 1,000 Americans which 
showed that “51 percent of respondents believe[d] that stormy weather [could] interfere with 
cloud computing” and only “16 percent actually knew what the cloud was”). 
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of “cloud computing,”55 this confusion is understandable.  Yet the fact is 
that the majority of computer and smartphone users already consume cloud 
services on a daily (even hourly) basis.56  Web-based email, calendars, 
spreadsheet editors, and word-processing programs like the current offer-
ings from Google, Microsoft, and others are all examples of cloud-
computing services already in common use.57  Without knowing what the 
term denotes, it seems, society has already begun rising into the cloud. 
Jurisprudence, however, does not have that luxury.  Before courts can 
adjudicate disputes that arise in the cloud, they must understand what cloud 
computing is, how it differs from previous architectures, and what implica-
tions those differences carry for jurisdiction and choice of law. 
More than a few skeptics have posited that “cloud computing” is noth-
ing more than a redundant buzzword, synonymous and coextensive with the 
Internet.58  It is our aim in the following Part not only to provide a high-
level understanding of the evolution and structure of cloud-computing pro-
cesses, but also to reply to such skepticism.  Cloud services exhibit unique 
technological and legal features that will require specialized analyses.  In 
short, cloud computing—though it shares some similarities with, and fre-
quently leverages the communicative capabilities of, the Internet—is not an 
empty concept. 
1.  Technological Structure 
The most commonly cited description of cloud computing is the Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology’s (“NIST”) definition: “a 
model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a 
shared pool of configurable computing resources . . . that can be rapidly 
provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service pro-
                                                          
 55.  See, e.g., Miranda Mowbray, The Fog over the Grimpen Mire: Cloud Computing and the 
Law, 6 SCRIPTED 133, 134 (2009) (“[T]here is no agreed upon definition of cloud computing.”); 
Geoffrey A. Fowler & Ben Worthen, The Internet Industry Is on a Cloud—Whatever That May 
Mean, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB123802623665542725.html (“While almost everybody in the tech industry seems to have a 
cloud-themed project, few agree on the term’s definition.”). 
 56.  See Walton, supra note 54 (describing survey results revealing that ninety-five percent of 
the respondents used cloud-based services daily).   
 57.  See Lametti, supra note 40, at 209 (identifying Google Docs, Microsoft Office Live, and 
Gmail as “Cloud-based application[s]”). 
 58.  See, e.g., Warren B. Chik, Paying It Forward: The Case for a Specific Statutory Limita-
tion on Exclusive Rights for User-Generated Content Under Copyright Law, 11 J. MARSHALL 
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 240, 244 (2011) (“There is no consensus on the definition of ‘Web 2.0’ or 
even that it is anything more than a buzzword.”). 
 2013]      PERSONAL JURISDICTION & CHOICE OF LAW 325 
vider interaction.”59  Put another way, cloud computing is a model that al-
lows for on-demand “scalability” of computing power by end users that are 
located remotely from the computing resources themselves.60  The NIST 
definition goes on to list five attributes of cloud computing: (1) on-demand 
self-service, (2) broad network access, (3) resource pooling, (4) rapid elas-
ticity or expansion, and (5) measured service.61  Essentially, cloud-service 
providers make a pool of servers available to distributed end users who can 
rapidly harness those servers’ collective computing power when needed 
(“scaling up”), then rapidly release that power when the desired task is 
completed (“scaling down”).62 
Cloud computing also allows “workload migration”—service provid-
ers can easily shift workloads across servers, both inside local data centers 
and among disparately located data centers.63  And this, in turn, allows sup-
pliers to route around any single server (or, frequently, even an entire data 
center) in case of technical failure, to allow for scheduled maintenance, or 
even to avoid consuming expensive peak-demand power in a certain geo-
graphic region.64  This resiliency and flexibility offers readily apparent ad-
vantages over traditional computing models for both producers and con-
sumers. 
The move to the cloud is a move away from consuming computing re-
sources as a product and toward viewing computing as a service.65  From 
the consumer’s perspective, cloud services generally eliminate the geo-
graphic location of hardware (other than the consumer’s own thin-client 
                                                          
 59.  PETER MELL & TIMOTHY GRANCE, NIST, SP 800-145, THE NIST DEFINITION OF CLOUD 
COMPUTING 2 (2011).  
 60.  See, e.g., Cindy Pham, Note, E-Discovery in the Cloud Era: What’s a Litigant to Do?, 5 
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 139, 142 (2013) (“[C]loud computing is an Internet-based service 
which provides users access to software, resources, and information stored elsewhere and man-
aged by someone else, anytime and anywhere.”).  
 61.  MELL & GRANCE, supra note 59, at 2. 
 62.  See Pham, supra note 60, at 139–40 (“[C]loud computing . . . can be scaled to individual 
needs.”).  
 63.  T. Sridhar, Cloud Computing—A Primer: Part 1: Models and Technologies, 12 
INTERNET PROTOCOL J. 2, 3 (2009) (defining “[w]orkload movement” by cloud-computing pro-
viders as “migrat[ing] workloads across servers—both inside the data center and across data cen-
ters”). 
 64.  See, e.g., Xuan Li & Jine-Chung Lo, Pricing and Peak Aware Scheduling Algorithm for 
Cloud Computing, 2012 IEEE 1 (2012). 
 65.  Accordingly, “[c]loud computing involves shifting the bulk of the costs from capital ex-
penditures . . . to an operating expense . . . model, where you pay for usage of these types of re-
sources.”  Sridhar, supra note 63, at 3. 
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hardware66) as a relevant aspect of computing.  So long as a network con-
nection exists, the physical location of end users, servers, and service pro-
viders—and their proximity to one another—is almost entirely irrelevant (at 
least outside a courtroom).  A U.S. citizen could, for example, use a 
smartphone to check her email from La Guardia airport in New York, edit a 
document from a desktop computer at a kiosk during a layover in Reykja-
vik, Iceland, and then schedule a calendar appointment using her laptop 
from a hotel in Vienna, Austria.  And regardless of her physical location, 
the actual computations she was directing could have been occurring on a 
server located anywhere on Earth.  As the NIST definition puts it, “[t]here 
is a sense of location independence in that the customer generally has no 
control or knowledge over the exact location of the provided resources.”67  
Indeed, the term “location independence” has been used elsewhere with 
some frequency to describe the phenomenon of the geographic irrelevance 
of computing resources in the cloud.68 
From the supplier’s perspective, cloud computing’s exact effect on the 
relevance of server location varies depending on each supplier’s particular 
practices.  Take, for example, Google’s email service.  Because Google ac-
tually owns its massive server farms, it can affirmatively choose to migrate 
workloads among its own servers from state to state, country to country, or 
even land to sea—in the case of offshore servers—to realize gains from 
whatever comparative advantages can be had in the new location.  To the 
extent Google does so, geographic location of servers remains relevant (at 
least to Google, if not to consumers or advertisers) because, in this scenario, 
Google has made affirmative, purposeful choices regarding the geographic 
location of the server farms handling workloads.  By way of contrast, con-
sider a firm offering a competing service that runs over metered service 
                                                          
 66.  The term “thin client” refers to the advent, made possible by cloud technologies, of end-
user devices with relatively little local computing capacity.  See, e.g., Lametti, supra note 40, at 
219 (“We are entering a period where ‘thin clients’ are becoming the norm.  These are devices 
with little computing capacity or need to perform computing functions on their own.”).  A 
smartphone, for example, may have far less computing ability than a laptop or desktop comput-
er—yet, by virtue of Internet connectivity and cloud services, an end-user with a smartphone can 
now harness far greater computing and storage capacity than a peer using an unconnected desktop 
computer.   
 67.  MELL & GRANCE, supra note 59, at 2.  As the NIST noted, of course, customers still 
“may be able to specify location at a higher level of abstraction (for example, country, state, or 
datacenter).”  Id. 
 68.  See, e.g., Simon Bradshaw et al., Contracts for Clouds: Comparison and Analysis of the 
Terms and Conditions of Cloud Computing Services, Queen Mary University of London, School 
of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 63/2010 (Sept. 1, 2010), at 5 (“Location independence 
means, from the customer’s perspective, that the services can be accessed from anywhere with 
suitable communications links.”). 
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purchased from Amazon’s cloud-services arm.  Here, the service provider 
may—like its consumers—be indifferent as to the geographic location of 
the actual computing power Amazon is providing.  Alternatively, cloud-
services contracts sometimes specify a large geographic zone encompassing 
multiple server farms within which migration can occur.69  To the extent 
that some real-space limitations are contemplated, geographic location of 
servers thus can remain salient to varying degrees. 
Regardless of the exact circumstances, the importance to service pro-
viders of computers’ actual geographic location is—from a technological 
standpoint—relatively minimal.  This is so because, at its core, cloud com-
puting consists of offering computing resources “that can be rapidly provi-
sioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider in-
teraction.”70  If this were not the case, many of the efficiencies offered by 
cloud services would disappear.  Location independence is an important—
even crucial—aspect of cloud computing for providers as well as custom-
ers.71 
2.  Legal Structure 
From a legal perspective, the cloud embodies a new template for inter-
actions: all interactions in the cloud—unlike those that occur purely via the 
Internet—are contract-based.  Previously, a consumer who purchased a 
computer had little or no ongoing contractual relationship with the supplier.  
When computing was a product, consumers purchased and consumed it lo-
cally like any other off-the-shelf good.  Similarly, visiting a passive Web 
1.0-type website generally does not trigger any ongoing contractual rela-
tionship.72  Computing as a service, however, is an entirely different matter.  
Like any contract for services, the provision and consumption of cloud-
computing services contemplates a contractual relationship that continues 
as long as the service is being provided.73  Consider, for example, an indi-
vidual consumer using a cloud-based word-processing application.  For as 
                                                          
 69.  See id. at 28 (noting that “[s]ome major cloud providers . . . have made a point of offering 
‘regional zones’ in which a customer may be assured that data will remain”). 
 70.  MELL & GRANCE, supra note 59, at 2 (emphasis added). 
 71.  See Bradshaw et al., supra note 68, at 5 (“Location independence is also an important 
factor for providers, who may seek to deploy their infrastructure wherever it is most convenient 
and efficient, and in a manner that maximises the economies of scale already mentioned.”). 
 72.  See Lev-Aretz, supra note 50, at 141 (“Under the Web 1.0 stage, the Web functioned as a 
read-only medium through numerous ‘static’ websites.”). 
 73. See Bradshaw et al., supra note 68, at 15–16 (surveying terms and conditions contracts for 
cloud services and concluding that “[i]t is not unusual to see a provision that the contract will con-
tinue indefinitely until it is terminated”). 
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long as she utilizes the application, that consumer is interacting with a sup-
plier under the terms of a contract—a contract for the performance of ser-
vices—in a way that an individual visiting a passive Web 1.0 website is not. 
3.  Welfare Gains from Cloud Adoption 
It nearly goes without saying that scalability in computing provides 
multiple benefits to suppliers and consumers, increasing both total and con-
sumer welfare.  Greater resiliency and location independence represent in-
creases in computing quality relative to pre-cloud products.  Cost and price 
advantages are present as well.  On the demand side, consumers of compu-
ting services generally exhibit variable demand; that is, they require differ-
ent amounts of computing power at different times.74  Yet consumers who 
opt to use cloud-computing services can purchase only the computing ser-
vices they actually use, instead of being forced to purchase enough capacity 
to meet maximum demand.75  Relatedly, shifting computing purchases to 
the cloud allows customers to transform the outlays incurred from capital 
expenditures, which are front-loaded, to operating expenditures, which are 
more evenly distributed.76  On the supply side, providers of cloud services 
can attain economies of scale “by sharing resources between a pool of cus-
tomers and buying infrastructure in bulk.”77  These reduced costs, assuming 
that the provider is operating in a competitive market, may then be passed 
on to consumers in the form of lower prices.78 
4.  Legal Implications 
The shift to cloud computing, like any other major technological up-
heaval, has not been—and will not be—entirely free of legal obstacles.  
Cloud-computing models have been rapidly adopted by providers and us-
                                                          
 74.  Id. at 5. 
 75.  Mowbray, supra note 55, at 145–46 (“For buyers, one advantage of using cloud compu-
ting, as opposed to buying all the hardware and software necessary to meet their computing needs, 
is that they only need to pay for the computing services that they actually use.”). 
 76.  See Bradshaw et al., supra note 68, at 3 (describing the transformation of capital expendi-
tures to operating expenditures). 
 77.  Id.  It should be noted that, as to a private cloud (owned and operated internally by one 
firm), the “pool-of-customers” advantage does not apply.   
 78.  See Lametti, supra note 40, at 213 (“The resource pooling that is possible using cloud 
technology means lower overall costs (through lowered costs for the provider, who then offers 
services at lower costs to users) . . . .”).  Alternatively, if the provider has already opted to offer 
services at zero price, the savings might be passed along in other ways, including displaying fewer 
advertisements to users (thereby lowering users’ attention costs incurred in using the service) or a 
less-intrusive data-usage policy. 
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ers,79 a transition spurred on by the efficiencies noted above.80  These bene-
fits have not come without a price, however.  Sprawling legal disputes have 
already arisen out of cloud-based interactions in substantive areas ranging 
from personal privacy,81 to copyright infringement,82 to antitrust,83 and 
myriad more.  Before these issues can be properly adjudicated, however, 
courts must address the two fundamental threshold procedural questions 
addressed by this Article: jurisdiction and choice of law. 
Though the ramifications of procedural decision making in these areas 
will indeed be far reaching within the context of the cloud, it is also critical 
to recognize their importance for future developments.  Just as the law of 
the Internet can provide a guidepost for analyzing legal issues related to 
cloud computing, so too will cloud-computing decisions provide the bed-
rock upon which the law for yet-to-be-developed technologies will be 
built.84  The significance of the decisions being made now and in the near 
future cannot be overstated. 
                                                          
 79.  See Mowbray, supra note 55, at 2 (“Cloud computing is part of a general architectural 
trend in the computer industry, moving from users doing computing on their own hardware using 
copies of software that they own, to users doing computing on other peoples’ machines some-
where in the cloud, using software that they rent.”). 
 80.  See supra Part II.C.1 & 3. 
 81.  In the civil context, see, for example, In re iPhone Application Litigation, 844 F. Supp. 
2d 1040, 1057–59 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding that the type of end-user device is relevant to the lev-
el of protection afforded to data stored in the cloud), and Rene v. G.F. Fishers, Inc., 817 F. Supp. 
2d 1090, 1096 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (determining that unopened emails are subject to the protections of 
the Stored Communications Act).  In the criminal context, see In re United States’ Application for 
a Search Warrant to Seize and Search Electronic Devices from Edward Cunnius, 770 F. Supp. 2d 
1138, 1144–45 (W.D. Wash. 2011) (denying application for search warrant based on its “bound-
less” scope due to the interconnectedness of digital devices), and In re Application of the United 
States for Historical Cell Site Data, 747 F. Supp. 2d 827, 845–46 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (denying re-
quests for disclosure of location data for cell phones on Fourth Amendment grounds).   
 82.  See, e.g., Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 139–40 (2d Cir. 
2008) (holding that storing copyrighted television programs on proprietary servers and delivering 
them via a closed-circuit network to consumers constituted copyright infringement).  
 83.  The FTC recently announced—though it ultimately abandoned—an investigation into 
possible anticompetitive behavior by Google, Inc.  Steve Lohr, F.T.C. Said to Prepare for Lawsuit 
vs. Google, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2012, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/13/technology/ftc-staff-prepares-antitrust-case-against-google-
over-search.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  The gravamen of the investigation was Google’s possi-
ble manipulation of results delivered by its dominant search engine so as to favor internal cloud-
based software services like Google Maps, to the detriment of competing services like MapQuest.  
Id.   
 84.  See David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment Prin-
ciples to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2205, 2219 
(2009) (“Courts often address new technologies by analogizing to older technologies, in the same 
way novel legal theories generally find their proper footing by analogy to precedent.”)  
 330 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 73:313 
III.  PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND CHOICE OF LAW: HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 
Both jurisdiction and choice of law enjoy rich historical backgrounds.  
Principles of constitutional federalism have allowed states to construct var-
ied approaches to these issues that span wide and diverse continua.85  Ac-
cordingly, while there are certain prevailing theories that have risen to 
prominence and gained solid footing in the law—especially in choice-of-
law jurisprudence—examining the various philosophies underlying these 
critical threshold issues is essential to provide context for our proposed so-
lutions to the cloud-computing conundrums.  The Parts below review the 
maturation of personal-jurisdiction and choice-of-law theories throughout 
the years, with a particular focus on the advents of, and legal adaptations to, 
new technologies. 
A.  Personal Jurisdiction: Gatekeeper of Civil Litigation 
Personal jurisdiction is, put simply, “[a] court’s power to bring a per-
son into its adjudicative process.”86  “Personal jurisdiction asks a simple 
question.  It asks whether a particular court may enter judgment against a 
particular defendant in a particular case.”87  Unlike choice of law—which is 
open-ended in the sense that each party may argue for application of a dif-
ferent set of laws and the court may apply still a third set of laws not ad-
vanced by either party—personal jurisdiction is a binary battle.  That is to 
say that it is either existent or not;88 there is no possible “third outcome” 
that a court might reach.  Personal jurisdiction is also unique from choice of 
                                                          
 85.  See Charles W. Rhodes, The Predictability Principle in Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine: 
A Case Study on the Effect of a “Generally” Too Broad, but “Specifically” Too Narrow Approach 
to Minimum Contacts, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 135, 137–38 (2005) (personal jurisdiction); Genevieve 
G. York-Erwin, Note, The Choice-of-Law Problem(s) in the Class Action Context, 84 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1793, 1796 (2009) (choice of law).  But see Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de 
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702–03 n.10 (1982) (“The restriction on state sovereign power . . . must be 
seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process 
Clause.  That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction requirement and the Clause 
itself makes no mention of federalism concerns.”).  Many states, however, provide for personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant to the fullest extent allowable within the contours of constitutional 
due process.  In this instance, courts sometimes “pass over” the state-law analysis and “collapse it 
into[] the due process inquiry.”  Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int’l, Inc., 593 
F.3d 1249, 1258 & n.8 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 86.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 857 (7th ed. 1999).  
 87.  Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV. 971, 979 (2009). 
 88.  See Rhodes, supra note 85, at 136–37.   
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law in that it is one-sided, that is, there is no such thing as a court lacking 
personal jurisdiction over a plaintiff.89 
The following Subparts trace the history of personal jurisdiction90—
from its roots in the English common law,91 to the landmark Supreme Court 
case International Shoe Co. v. Washington,92 up through the close of the 
Pre-Network Era.93  We break at the advent of the Internet because although 
each of these aforementioned periods is distinct from the period before or 
after it, they all share the common theme that personal jurisdiction is based 
on some notion of physicality.94  In other words, the defendant—either in 
personam or, in the case of a business, by way of a distributed product in 
commerce—had to be physically present in some sense in the jurisdiction 
where the lawsuit was initiated for jurisdiction to be proper.  As we discuss 
later, however, the advent of the Internet changed this longstanding notion, 
and personal-jurisdiction Internet cases thus cannot—or at least in our view, 
should not—be grouped with these previous cases reflecting comparatively 
small adjustments of the technological rudder. 
1.  The Old Guard: Physical Presence and the Transient Rule 
The notion of personal jurisdiction over a party dates back to fifteenth 
century England.  As early as 1482, the idea that the judgment of a court 
that lacked jurisdiction over a defendant was void had already gained a 
foothold,95 and the principle became firmly cemented into the English 
common law by Lord Coke more than a century later.96  At that time, 
                                                          
 89.  Cf. Wendy C. Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and Substantive Due Process: Personal Jurisdiction 
and Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV. 479, 508–09 (1987) (“[M]odern courts continue 
to perceive personal jurisdiction as a confrontation between state power and the defendant, with 
the plaintiff’s interest being largely irrelevant.”). 
 90.  Like others before us who have opined on personal jurisdiction, we “recognize the merit 
of critics of legal scholarship who decry the recitation of cases that make up the history of a doc-
trine.”  John N. Drobak, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. REV. 1015, 
1019 n.21 (1983) (citing Lawrence R. Velvel, Suggested Improvements in Legal Education, 29 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 194, 201 (1978) (noting the “often boring descriptions of the relevant cases”)).  
Nevertheless, we find it useful to provide a brief summary of the important decisions in this area 
of the law, especially given the vast departure from traditional brick-and-mortar, single-location 
entities that cloud-computing service providers represent. 
 91.  See infra Part III.A.1. 
 92.  See infra Part III.A.2. 
 93.  See infra Part III.A.3. 
 94.  See Perdue, supra note 89, at 509 (noting the long held presumption “that the proper 
scope of personal jurisdiction is closely tied to geographic boundaries”).   
 95.  Bowser v. Collins, 145 Eng. Rep. 97 (Ex. Ch. 1482). 
 96.  Case of the Marshalsea, (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (K.B.) 1039. 
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though, jurisdiction was based primarily on a defendant’s consent to a 
court’s ability to adjudicate a particular dispute, as opposed to a court’s 
power over a party.97  Perhaps not surprisingly, this submissiveness gradu-
ally morphed into courts obtaining defendants’ consent by inducement or 
force,98 and around the turn of the nineteenth century, English courts’ de-
terminations of jurisdiction appeared to be based more on judicial authority 
than on a party’s voluntary submission.99 
Naturally, these concepts migrated from England and became incorpo-
rated into early American common law, and several cases from the first half 
of the nineteenth century reflected the principle of coram non judice—
”before a person, not a judge.”100  It was not until 1878, however, that the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Pennoyer v. Neff101 established the rule that service 
in the forum state was both necessary and sufficient for a court to exercise 
personal jurisdiction.  In Pennoyer, an Oregon court determined that the de-
fendant, who was neither a resident of Oregon nor physically present in Or-
egon, had been constructively served by a newspaper publication in Ore-
gon.102  The Supreme Court disagreed.  In finding the service to be 
inadequate, the Supreme Court announced what has become known as the 
“transient rule” of personal jurisdiction: “To give [judicial] proceedings any 
validity . . . [a defendant] must be brought within [a state’s] jurisdiction by 
service of process within the State, or his voluntary appearance.”103 
Immediately after Pennoyer, it appeared that physical presence was 
both necessary and sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon a court over a par-
ticular defendant.  The “sufficient” prong of that phrase holds true today 
                                                          
 97.  Albert A. Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The “Power” Myth 
and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 296 (1956) (“Early judicial procedure depended upon 
voluntary subjection of both parties to the court’s judgment.”). 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  See id. at 298 (discussing the English cases Mostyn v. Fabrigas, (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 
1021 (K.B.) 1030, 1 COWP. 161, 1076–77 and Buchanan v. Rucker, (1808) 103 Eng. Rep. 546 
(K.B.) 547). 
 100.  See, e.g., Boswell’s Lessee v. Otis, 9 How. 336, 350 (1850); Steel v. Smith, 7 Watts & 
Serg. 447, 448 (Pa. 1844) (“Jurisdiction of the person or property of an alien is founded on its 
presence or situs within the territory.  Without this presence or situs, an exercise of jurisdiction is 
an act of usurpation.”); Evans v. Instine, 7 Ohio 273, 275 (1835); Dunn v. Dunn, 4 Paige 425 
(N.Y. Ch. 1834); Picquet v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609 (No. 11,134) (C.C. Mass. 1828); Grumon v. 
Raymond, 1 Conn. 40, 45 (Conn. 1814) (“Where there is a want of jurisdiction over the person . . . 
it is the same as though there was no court.  It is coram non judice.”). 
 101.  95 U.S. 714 (1878). 
 102.  Id. at 719–20. 
 103.  Id. at 733.  Pennoyer is also significant in that the Supreme Court announced that person-
al jurisdiction is based on an individual’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Right.  Id. 
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and was affirmed by the Supreme Court more than a century after Pennoyer 
in Burnham v. Superior Court.104  By contrast, however, the notion of phys-
ical presence as a mandatory prerequisite to jurisdiction slowly eroded in 
the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century (though perhaps un-
surprisingly).105  For example, subsequent to Pennoyer, some states began 
requiring nonresident corporations to designate in-state agents for service of 
process,106 and other states allowed substituted service over nonresident 
motorists who caused injury in a state but left before personal service could 
be effected.107  These and other exceptions to the requirement that defend-
ants be actually physically present in a given forum state eventually swal-
lowed the transient rule,108 and in 1945 the Supreme Court did away with 
Pennoyer altogether. 
2.  The Giant Footprint of International Shoe 
“[T]he unbending territorial limits on jurisdiction set forth in Pennoy-
er”109 were finally put to rest in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.110  
                                                          
 104.  495 U.S. 604 (1990).  In Burnham, the defendant, a resident of New Jersey, was served 
process pertaining to his estranged wife’s divorce petition while he was in California on a business 
trip and visiting his children.  Id. at 607–08.  In affirming the California Court of Appeal, the 
Court stated that “jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process.”  Id. at 
619.  See also Oxmans’ Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 273 N.W.2d 285, 286 (Wis. 1979) (“Physi-
cal presence is the traditional basis of judicial jurisdiction.”); Joel H. Spitz, Comment, The “Tran-
sient Rule” of Personal Jurisdiction: A Well-Intentioned Concept That Has Overstayed Its Wel-
come, 73 MARQ. L. REV. 181, 192 n.83 (1989) (collecting cases that reaffirm that the “sufficient” 
prong still holds true). 
 105.  Pennoyer recognized certain exceptions to the rigidity of the physical-presence require-
ment.  See, e.g., Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733–35 (divorce actions could be adjudicated in plaintiff’s 
home state even if defendant could not be served within that state); id. at 735–36 (approving of 
treating a foreign corporation doing business in a state as having consented to being sued in the 
state). 
 106.  E.g., St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 352–53 (1882) (summarizing Michigan law regard-
ing service of corporations). 
 107.  E.g., Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 164–67 (1916) (summarizing New Jersey law); 
see also Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356–57 (1927) (upholding a Massachusetts statute that 
appointed the state registrar as a person upon whom process can be served for a nonresident mo-
torist). 
 108.  See Ehrenzweig, supra note 97, at 309–12 (stating that the exceptions “have become so 
significant in number and weight that they have virtually overwhelmed the [Pennoyer] rule itself” 
and noting several exceptions). 
 109.  Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 618 (1990).   
 110.  326 U.S. 310 (1945).  This is true, however, only as to the “necessary” prong of physical 
presence as being both “necessary and sufficient.”  See supra note 104 and accompanying text 
(discussing Burnham and the significance of physical presence with regard to jurisdiction). 
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Hailed as a “watershed in the law of personal jurisdiction”111 and revered as 
the “prince” that “slew the evil dragon” of Pennoyer,112 International Shoe 
set forth a new governing test for defining the outer bounds of a court’s ex-
ercise of personal jurisdiction that still serves as the bedrock of the doctrine 
today. 
International Shoe Co. (“Shoe Co.”) was a Delaware corporation with 
its principal place of business in St. Louis, Missouri.113  Shoe Co. manufac-
tured shoes in, and distributed shoes from, several states other than Wash-
ington, and did not have any offices or any contracts for the sale or pur-
chase of merchandise in Washington.114  Shoe Co. did, however, employ 
salesmen under the direct supervision and control of managers in St. Louis 
and supplied the salesmen with shoe samples that the salesmen would 
sometimes exhibit in rented rooms in Washington.115  The salesmen resided 
in Washington and were compensated based on sales made there.116  The 
salesmen would send shoe orders back to Shoe Co.’s St. Louis office, where 
the orders would be filled and the shoes shipped into Washington from oth-
er states.117 
The issue in International Shoe was whether Shoe Co., based on the 
above-mentioned contacts with Washington, was within the scope of Wash-
ington’s Unemployment Compensation Act.118  If Shoe Co. was, then it 
needed to contribute a percentage of its employees’ annual wages to Wash-
ington’s state unemployment compensation fund.  The State of Washington 
sued Shoe Co. for past contributions and personally served a Shoe Co. 
salesman in Washington.  Shoe Co. then appeared specially to contest juris-
diction.119  After several appeals, the Supreme Court of Washington ruled 
that Shoe Co. was amenable to suit in Washington.120 
                                                          
 111.  Logan Everett Sawyer III, Jurisdiction, Jurisprudence, and Legal Change: Sociological 
Jurisprudence and the Road to International Shoe, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 59, 59 (2001). 
 112.  Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Tale of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 257, 
258 (1990). 
 113.  Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 313. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 313–14. 
 116.  Id. at 313. 
 117.  Id. at 314. 
 118.  Id. at 311. 
 119.  Id. at 312. 
 120.  See id. at 314 (articulating the Supreme Court of Washington’s reasoning “that the regu-
lar and systematic solicitation of orders in the state by appellant’s salesman, resulting in a contin-
uous flow of appellant’s product into the state, was sufficient to constitute doing business in the 
state so as to make appellant amenable to suit in its courts”). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court agreed.  In doing so, the Court announced the 
standard for personal jurisdiction that has been echoed often and thunder-
ously over the last six-plus decades121: 
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to 
a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory 
of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that 
the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.122 
The Court declined, however, to adopt any sort of bright-line test or 
standard that was “mechanical or quantitative” like the Pennoyer test.123  
Instead, the Court determined that whether due process was satisfied de-
pended “upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and 
orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due pro-
cess clause to insure.”124  This inquiry requires examining, inter alia, “the 
extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities 
within a state” such that “it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of 
that state.”125 
It is worth noting that the Court was clear in International Shoe that 
the basis of the suit—Shoe Co.’s obligation to contribute to the state unem-
ployment fund—arose from Shoe Co.’s specific contacts with the forum 
state.126  The Court did not, however, foreclose the notion that jurisdiction 
can still be proper even when the events giving rise to a lawsuit are unrelat-
ed to a nonresident corporation’s contacts with the forum state.127  In such a 
case, jurisdiction is proper because the defendant corporation is said to be 
“present” within the forum state by having “systematic and continuous” 
contacts.128 
                                                          
 121.  See Frank B. Cross & James F. Spriggs II, The Most Important (and Best) Supreme Court 
Opinions and Justices, 60 EMORY L.J. 407, 437 tbl.3 (2010) (listing International Shoe as the 
eighteenth most-cited Supreme Court opinion by federal district courts). 
 122.  Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 123.  Id. at 319; see supra note 103 and accompanying text (setting forth the transient rule 
from Pennoyer). 
 124.  Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. at 320. 
 127.  See id. at 318 (“[T]here have been instances in which the continuous corporate operations 
within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes 
of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”). 
 128.  See id. at 318, 320 (stating that “it may be said that [certain] authorized acts [are] of such 
a nature as to justify the fiction” that a corporation has consented to service and suit “through the 
acts of its authorized agents” in the forum state). 
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3.  Stream-of-Commerce and Far-Reaching Effects Theories 
The Supreme Court’s adoption of the “minimum contacts” standard in 
International Shoe was a reaction to the evolving methods by which busi-
ness was conducted in the twentieth century.  As cross-country and inter-
state transportation became more prevalent, firms were broadening the 
reach of their services and products to consumers in all corners of the coun-
try.129  And while the standard set forth in International Shoe certainly ap-
plies to individuals, the opinion itself is plainly geared toward business enti-
ties.130 
Although International Shoe is a single case, it is undoubtedly an im-
portant one.  But, as with many standard-setting cases, the progeny that fol-
lowed International Shoe is (at least arguably) just as important as Interna-
tional Shoe itself—for it is the subsequent cases interpreting a new standard 
that often truly define the standard’s contours.131  A comprehensive review 
of all subsequent cases interpreting and applying International Shoe could 
easily consume an entire civil procedure class.  Thus, we have chosen to 
touch upon only the leading cases to set the stage for discussing the law of 
the Internet.132 
We begin with a 1961 case out of the Illinois Supreme Court, Gray v. 
American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.133  In Gray, an Illinois res-
ident sued an Ohio company, alleging negligent construction of a safety 
                                                          
 129.  See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 617 (1990) (“In the late 19th and early 
20th centuries, changes in the technology of transportation and communication, and the tremen-
dous growth of interstate business activity, led to an ‘inevitable relaxation of the strict limits on 
state jurisdiction’ over nonresident individuals and corporations.” (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 
357 U.S. 235, 260 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting))). 
 130.  See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316 (“Since the corporate personality is a fiction, 
although a fiction intended to be acted upon as though it were a fact, it is clear that unlike an indi-
vidual its ‘presence’ without, as well as within, the state of its origin can be manifested only by 
activities carried on in its behalf by those who are authorized to act for it.” (internal citation omit-
ted)); see also Sawyer, supra note 111, at 59–60 (“International Shoe resulted directly from the 
inability of the Pennoyer doctrine to adjust to the twentieth century expansion of corporate busi-
ness. . . .  In short, the standard explanation claims International Shoe simply adjusted constitu-
tional doctrine to the practical demands of society.”). 
 131.  See, e.g., Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 583 (1941) (“leav[ing] it to future judicial 
decisions to determine precisely where the line shall be drawn”); In re Seagate Tech. LLC, 497 
F.3d 1360, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“We leave it to future cases to further develop the application of 
this standard.”); cf. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977) (“Whatever precise content may 
be given those terms by later cases, we feel confident in holding without further elaboration that 
they do not exist here.”); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44–45 (1971) (establish-
ing a new standard for First Amendment libel actions while “leaving the delineation of the reach 
of [certain] term[s] to future cases”). 
 132.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 133.  176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961).   
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valve on a water heater that had exploded and injured him.  The defendant 
moved to dismiss on the grounds that it did not conduct business in Illinois, 
had no agent physically present in Illinois, and sold the valves to another 
defendant outside Illinois for incorporation into the water heater.134  The 
court recognized that “the defendant’s only contact with [Illinois was] 
found in the fact that a product manufactured in Ohio was incorporated in 
Pennsylvania, into a hot water heater which in the course of commerce was 
sold to an Illinois consumer.”135 
Nevertheless, the court found that this contact passed muster under In-
ternational Shoe.  The court determined that “it is not unreasonable, where 
a cause of action arises from alleged defects in [a] product, to say that the 
use of such products in the ordinary course of commerce is sufficient con-
tact with this State to justify a requirement that [a company] defend 
here.”136  This holding was based on “the increasing specialization of com-
mercial activity and the growing interdependence of business enterpris-
es.”137  The Gray court’s reasoning has become known as the “stream-of-
commerce theory” in personal jurisdiction.138 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has been reluctant to accept Gray’s 
stream-of-commerce theory for personal jurisdiction.  In World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,139 the Court rejected the notion that a com-
pany having no other contacts with the forum state could be subject to ju-
risdiction there merely because a consumer transported its product to a state 
other than the state where the product was purchased.140  The Court noted 
the limits on the stream-of-commerce theory, stating that “‘foreseeability’ 
alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under 
the Due Process Clause,”141 and asserting that acceptance of the stream-of-
commerce theory in its purest form would have the effect of “appoint[ing] 
the chattel [as an] agent for service of process.”142 
                                                          
 134.  Id. at 762. 
 135.  Id. at 764. 
 136.  Id. at 766. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and McIntyre, 
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 207–08 (2011). 
 139.  444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 140.  Id. at 299. 
 141.  Id. at 295. 
 142.  Id. at 296. 
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Later, in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,143 the Court 
unanimously declined to find personal jurisdiction over a Japanese firm that 
manufactured tire valves and sold them to a Taiwanese corporation, which 
subsequently incorporated the valves into motorcycle tires sold in Califor-
nia.144  The Asahi Court held that “a finding of minimum contacts must 
come about by an action of the defendant purposefully directed toward the 
forum State,” and that “[t]he placement of a product into the stream of 
commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully di-
rected toward the forum State.”145 
As we wrap up this Subpart, there is one other case—Burger King 
Corp. v. Rudzewicz146—that warrants individual attention and that serves as 
a jumping-off point for our discussion of Internet personal jurisdiction.  
Burger King is of particular importance because it is a contract case and, as 
detailed above, the legal structure of the cloud is based primarily on a con-
tract theory.147  Additionally, Burger King deals with intellectual property 
(albeit in a roundabout way), a common source of litigation in the cloud.148  
Burger King involved a lawsuit by the Burger King Corporation against two 
of its fast-food restaurant franchisees for breach of a franchise agreement 
and trademark infringement.149  Burger King sued in Florida, where its 
headquarters were located and where the agreement was primarily negotiat-
ed, though the franchisees and individual restaurant at issue were located in 
Michigan.150  The Supreme Court, in reversing the Eleventh Circuit,151 de-
termined that jurisdiction was proper over the defendants even though they 
had no physical presence in Florida.152  The Court relied on the defendants’ 
                                                          
 143.  480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 144.  Id. at 116. 
 145.  Id. at 112.  Two very recent Supreme Court cases provide additional support for the idea 
that the stream-of-commerce theory is, at least with regard to foreign defendants, surviving only 
on life support.  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854–57 
(2011); J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2790–91 (2011).  For a more 
detailed discussion of Goodyear and McIntyre, see Peterson, supra note 138, at 211–18 (Good-
year) and 218–35 (McIntyre). 
 146.  471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 147.  See supra Part II.C.2. 
 148.  See, e.g., supra note 82. 
 149.  Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 468–69. 
 150.  Id. at 464–67. 
 151.  Id. at 487. 
 152.  Id. at 476 (“Jurisdiction in these circumstances may not be avoided merely because the 
defendant did not physically enter the forum State.”). 
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many communications sent via mail regarding the franchisee agreement to 
establish the requisite minimum contacts with Florida.153 
In a foreshadowing of future communications technology and the liti-
gation that would ensue as a result, Justice Brennan stated in Burger King: 
 Although territorial presence frequently will enhance a potential 
defendant’s affiliation with a State and reinforce the reasonable 
foreseeability of suit there, it is an inescapable fact of modern 
commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted 
solely by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus 
obviating the need for physical presence within a State in which 
business is conducted.  So long as a commercial actor’s efforts 
are “purposefully directed” toward residents of another State, we 
have consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical 
contacts can defeat personal jurisdiction there.154 
4.  Summary 
What began as a change merely recognized by International Shoe 
eventually came to serve as the basis of the holding in Burger King.  The 
shift from local firms doing business locally, to local firms doing business 
nationally, to national firms doing business nationally and internationally, 
meant new challenges for courts on issues relating to personal jurisdiction.  
Although the current landscape of Internet and cloud commerce could be 
phrased roughly as “invisible firms doing business everywhere,” the themes 
echoed in the cases above provide valuable insight into the current state of 
the law155 and, crucially for our discussion below, what its future will be. 
B.  Choice of Law: Rule Maker of Civil Litigation 
Choice of law is the pre-merits question that necessarily follows that 
of jurisdiction.  Broadly speaking, before a court reaches the substantive is-
sues presented by a lawsuit, it must first decide whether it has the authority 
to apply any laws to the facts at hand, that is, whether it has jurisdiction.156  
                                                          
 153.  Id. at 479–82. 
 154.  Id. at 476. 
 155.  See, e.g., Richard Philip Rollo, Note, The Morass of Internet Personal Jurisdiction: It Is 
Time for a Paradigm Shift, 51 FLA. L. REV. 667, 678 (1999) (“Many courts hold that the appropri-
ate personal jurisdiction standard based upon Internet contacts is analogous to the stream of com-
merce standard in Asahi.”). 
 156.  See supra text accompanying note 86.   
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If jurisdiction is proper, courts must then determine which law or set of 
laws it ought to apply—it must make a “choice of law.”157 
The evolution158 of choice of law in the United States has followed an 
uneven path.  As an initial note, “choice of law” is a somewhat nebulous 
term in U.S. jurisprudence and scholarship.  Depending on the speaker, it 
can encompass concepts as far-ranging as the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments, the extraterritorial reach of U.S. laws, and “vertical” conflicts 
between federal and state laws.  As used herein, however, “choice of law” 
refers to situations where the laws of two or more jurisdictions might con-
ceivably govern a set of actions or events.  Put another way, it contemplates 
“horizontal” conflicts between laterally situated laws.  It is within this area 
of focus that the following Parts briefly retrace the history of U.S. choice-
of-law theory and summarize the primary modes of analysis still in use to-
day. 
1.  The Traditional Theories: Sovereignty, Comity, and “Vested 
Rights” 
Choice of law arose as a discrete area of jurisprudence in the United 
States following the publication of Justice Story’s treatise, Commentaries 
on the Conflict of Laws, in 1824.  As travel and trade between the states 
grew more prevalent, Story recognized that the common-law rule—English 
courts had always applied English law—was fast becoming antiquated.  
Story proposed two theoretical principles that greatly influenced subsequent 
courts and scholars: (1) each state has “exclusive sovereignty and jurisdic-
tion within its own territory”;159 and as a result, (2) the court of one sover-
eign jurisdiction may apply another sovereign’s laws, but it does so only as 
a matter of comity, that is, out of a sense of benevolence or neighborliness 
toward the foreign sovereign.160  Justice Story’s tenets, metaphysical as 
they were, unsurprisingly proved difficult to implement, for the Commen-
taries gave no real instructions on how or when the principles should be ap-
                                                          
 157.  As an initial note, there is a strain of thought in conflicts scholarship—the “local law” 
theory—that posits a different structure.  Under this view, courts always apply forum law—even 
when adjudicating disputes by referring to the content of foreign law—given that they have no 
power to do otherwise.  See, e.g., David F. Cavers, The Two “Local Law” Theories, 63 HARV. L. 
REV. 822, 824–25 (1950).  This theory has become relatively marginal today.  See, e.g., Louise 
Weinberg, Theory Wars in the Conflict of Laws, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1631, 1634–37 (2005).  
 158.  In this context, even that word is an arguable choice, implying as it does that the law has, 
in fact, progressed. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 159.  JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18 (1883). 
 160.  Id. § 38. 
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plied.  It would be over a century before another scholar attempted to sup-
ply those answers. 
In 1934, the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws (“First Restate-
ment”) was promulgated, with Professor Joseph Beale as its primary archi-
tect.  Underlying the First Restatement was the theory that an individual’s 
legal cause of action was a legal right, one that inhered—or “vested”—in 
that individual at a specific point in time.161  It followed, under Beale’s log-
ic, that the state within whose sovereign borders such a right vested should 
be the state whose substantive law applies to any ensuing litigation.162  Jus-
tice Story’s notion of territorial “sovereignty” as critical to choice-of-law 
analysis was thus carried forward by Beale.163 
Unsurprisingly, given its theoretical underpinnings, the First Restate-
ment approach heavily emphasized physical location and territoriality.  The 
obvious problem, of course, lies in determining the precise temporal and 
spatial point at which rights vested, leading Beale to enunciate a rigid set of 
rules that were supposed to do just that.  Broadly speaking, the First Re-
statement rules specify which aspects of which events indicate that a cause 
of action has become a vested right, pinpointing a moment in time and 
space where the location of individuals, property, or events indicate the ju-
risdiction whose laws ought to apply.164 
More specifically, the First Restatement sets forth three primary rules 
that govern tort, contract, and property law disputes.  In tort, whether a 
cause of action exists is dependent on lex locus delicti, the “law of the place 
of wrong.”165  Additional sections enumerate specific issues that are so 
governed.166  As to contract, the relevant rule depends on whether the dis-
pute at bar involves contract formation or performance.  Issues involving 
                                                          
 161.  See JOSEPH H. BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8A.8 (1935). 
 162.  Beale’s rules were, as David Cavers pointed out, “jurisdiction-selecting rule[s],” that is, 
they required a court to determine which jurisdiction’s set of laws applied to a case, rather than 
which law should apply.  David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. 
REV. 173, 194 (1933). 
 163.  See Donald Earl Childress III, Comity as Conflict: Resituating International Comity as 
Conflict of Laws, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 11, 36 & n.133 (2010) (“The first question in any con-
flicts case for Beale . . . was to determine the jurisdiction of nations . . . because Beale viewed law 
as fundamentally territorial and, thus, no law had effect outside of its own territory.”). 
 164.  See generally William M. Richman & David Riley, The First Restatement of Conflict of 
Laws on the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary of Its Successor: Contemporary Practice in Traditional 
Courts, 56 MD. L. REV. 1196 (1997) (analyzing contemporary applications of the First Restate-
ment). 
 165.  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384 (1934) (interstate torts). 
 166.  E.g., id. §§ 378 (whether a cognizable injury occurred) and 379 (whether liability is strict 
or dependent on negligence or intent). 
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contract formation are governed by the law of the state where the contract 
was formed;167 issues involving performance are governed by the law of the 
place of performance.168  Conflicts involving real property fall under the 
“situs” rule, that is, they are governed by the law of the place where the 
property is situated.169  Many, though not all, conflicts involving movable 
property are also covered by this rule.170 
On the whole, Beale’s vested-rights theory was designed to provide a 
unified framework under which courts could easily and mechanically de-
termine which set of laws should apply to disputes with multijurisdictional 
elements, thus furthering the formalist school’s cherished goals of uniformi-
ty and predictability of outcomes.  Indeed, “it was generally believed that 
the entire field could be covered by a relatively small number of simple 
rules.”171  This promise of efficiency and restraint on judicial discretion led 
to the First Restatement’s rapid adoption by most states.172 
Yet Beale’s territorial rules, elegant as they may have been in theory, 
utterly failed to produce uniform results in practice.  Judges faced with ap-
plying inflexible rules to complex choice-of-law questions almost immedi-
ately began using “escape devices.”173  Perhaps the most widely used es-
cape device was “characterization.”  Though Beale had implicitly assumed 
otherwise, determining what sort of issue is at play in a given choice-of-law 
case (for example, contract performance versus formation) is a process that 
leaves considerable wiggle room for judges inclined to pursue normative 
ends.  Consider a breach-of-contract case where the parties dispute whether 
the obligor’s performance satisfied an arguably ambiguous contract term.  
Is the issue one of contract-making (causing the law of the place of con-
tracting to apply) due to the contract’s inclusion of the ambiguous term, or 
one of performance (causing the law of the place of contract performance to 
apply)?  In such instances, the First Restatement left enough latitude for 
courts to engage in “characterization” and ultimately choose the law that 
                                                          
 167.  Id. § 332 (validity of contracts). 
 168.  Id. § 358 (duty for performance).  
 169.  Id. §§ 214–54 (law governing “Immovables”). 
 170.  Compare, e.g., id. §§ 255–310 (law governing “Movables”), with id. §§ 303 (intestate 
succession governed by law of decedent’s domicile), 306 (same for testamentary succession). 
 171.  Willis L. M. Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 679, 679 (1963). 
 172.  See Patrick J. Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 357, 357 (1992) (“Until 1963 the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws (the First 
Restatement) commanded a nearly universal following.”). 
 173.  Richman & Riley, supra note 164, at 1199. 
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appeared to be more equitable, appropriate, or perhaps easier to apply.174  
Other such escape devices included renvoi175 and the public policy excep-
tion.176 
Clearly, many courts were unwilling to surrender the ability to choose 
which law ought to apply in a case, even where their jurisdiction had nomi-
nally adopted the supposedly rigid, mechanistic First Restatement approach.  
This was not universally true—many judges have, over time, striven to ap-
ply the First Restatement rules as faithfully as possible.  And, particularly in 
“easy” cases, the First Restatement does offer a structured analysis that 
some judges find appealing.  Even today, ten jurisdictions still follow the 
First Restatement approach for tort claims, and twelve follow it in contract 
disputes.177  By any measure, however, it has fallen into steep decline rela-
tive to its former predominance. 
2.  The Modern Approaches: Governmental Interest Analysis, the 
Second Restatement, and “Better Law” 
After only a few decades—a period that has been called, only half-
jokingly, the “Reign of Terror”178—the ascendency of the vested-rights the-
ory began to wane.  The next revolution in choice-of-law analysis was ig-
nited by a series of articles authored by Professor Brainerd Currie.179  Ac-
cording to Currie, the primary problem with Beale’s “jurisdiction-selecting” 
                                                          
 174.  See, e.g., Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374, 383 (1878) (providing an often-cited example 
of characterization). 
 175.  In the breach-of-contract example used above, renvoi would entail the forum court choos-
ing not only to apply a foreign jurisdiction’s substantive contract law, but also that jurisdiction’s 
choice-of-law rules (i.e., the forum would “accept the renvoi”).  In instances where the foreign 
jurisdiction’s choice-of-law rule would refer the case to yet another jurisdiction, choosing to ac-
cept the renvoi would obviously affect the outcome—and perhaps allow a provincially minded 
forum court to apply its own law even under the guise of obeying Beale’s rules.  For an example 
of this in action, see Univ. of Chi. v. Dater, 270 N.W. 175, 176 (Mich. 1936) (applying Illinois 
law to a Michigan case). 
 176.  Some courts held that, where applying the law of another jurisdiction would conflict with 
a “fundamental” public policy of their own legislature or executive, “sovereignty” would win out 
and forum law should apply.  William L. Reynolds, Legal Process and Choice of Law, 56 MD. L. 
REV. 1371, 1378 (1997). 
 177.  See Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice-of-Law in the American Courts in 2011: Twenty-
Fifth Annual Survey, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 291, 309 tbl.1 (2012) (displaying an alphabetical list of 
U.S. states and the choice-of-law methodologies followed by each). 
 178.  Reynolds, supra note 176, at 1376. 
 179.  See Gary J. Simson, Choice-of-Law After the Currie Revolution: What Role for the Needs 
of the Interstate and International Systems?, 63 MERCER L. REV. 715, 716 (2012) (“[Currie’s] 
writings, far more than anyone else’s, sparked what many have come to call a ‘revolution’ in 
choice-of-law.”). 
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rules180 was that they failed entirely to take account of a sovereign’s inter-
ests.  That is, once a court selected the proper jurisdiction wherein a liti-
gant’s right had vested, it was to apply that jurisdiction’s law without any 
regard to whether the foreign sovereign actually had any legitimate interest 
in having its law apply to the facts at hand.181  In short, Currie argued that 
courts ought to consider such interests in making choice-of-law decisions.  
Applying this “interest analysis,” judges could weed out “false conflicts”—
situations in which only one jurisdiction has any actual interest in seeing its 
law applied.  Of course, not all conflicts are so easily adjudicated.  As to 
“real” conflicts, Currie settled on the arguably unprincipled rule that courts 
should default to applying the law of the forum.182 
Within scholarly circles, at least, interest analysis (in all its various it-
erations183) rapidly came to dominate the field of choice of law.  Today, 
however, only two jurisdictions still follow in Currie’s footsteps, and those 
two do so only for tort claims.184  Perhaps because it was such a radical 
shift from the First Restatement—and because it seemed to run directly 
counter to the goals of uniformity and predictability that had animated the 
First Restatement’s widespread adoption in the first place—interest analysis 
in its pure form has failed to gain widespread acceptance among courts.185 
In a watered-down form, however, Currie’s interest analysis was in-
corporated into the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (“Second Re-
statement”).  The Second Restatement, promulgated in 1971 and still in ef-
fect today, is a curious mélange: it contains Currie’s precepts, nestled 
within a more open-ended, policy-oriented analytical framework, yet it also 
sets forth territorial-centric presumptions that bear a strong resemblance to 
the rigid rules of the First Restatement.  The overarching rule, regardless of 
the substantive law, is that the applicable law is that of the state with the 
“most significant relationship” to the relevant events and parties.186 
                                                          
 180.  Cavers, supra note 162, at 194. 
 181.  See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 182.  Currie’s default-to-forum rule has been criticized by many; for one notable example, see 
William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1963) (argu-
ing that “[n]ormative resolution of real conflicts cases is possible”). 
 183.  See, e.g., id. at 18 (explaining the least-impairment method). 
 184.  See Symeonides, supra note 177, at 309 (identifying California and the District of Co-
lumbia as the only jurisdictions following Currie’s interest analysis). 
 185.  See Reynolds, supra note 176, at 1383–84 (“The influence [of Currie], however, is al-
most solely in the academy; although judges often mention Currie, they rarely follow his lead.”). 
 186.  See Simona Grossi, Rethinking the Harmonization of Jurisdictional Rules, 86 TUL. L. 
REV. 623, 646 (2012) (noting that most “American courts . . . have adopted the most significant 
relationship approach” to resolving conflicts of laws and “have abandoned the traditional vested-
rights approach”). 
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The Second Restatement’s analytical structure involves three steps.  
First, the issue must be categorized as, for example, a “contracts” problem 
or a “torts” problem.187  Second, to help determine which state has the most 
significant relationship, the Second Restatement creates a set of presump-
tions contained in specific sections that cover various types of tort or con-
tract issues.188  But because these rules are only presumptions,189 the analy-
sis does not end there.  Instead, a court must decide which state truly has the 
most significant relationship in light of enunciated general choice-of-law 
principles190 and the lists of relevant contacts for tort191 or contract192 is-
sues. 
The Second Restatement has been “savaged” by the majority of legal 
scholars.193  Yet courts have eagerly embraced it, likely because its pre-
sumptive rules provide at least the appearance of structure while its more 
general factors allow a fair amount of flexibility.194  Partly as a result of this 
judicial popularity, no strong push has been made toward promulgating a 
                                                          
 187.  See Harold P. Southerland, A Plea for the Proper Use of the Second Restatement of Con-
flict of Laws, 27 VT. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2002) (describing the framework of the Second Restatement). 
 188.  See id. at 9 (explaining that “[t]he specific rules of the Second Restatement . . . are cast 
only in the form of presumptions”). 
 189.  See id. (“[I]t is vital to recognize that in every case the presumption can be rebutted by 
reference to the general principles sections read in light of the choice-influencing principles”). 
 190.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971).  Section 6 states those prin-
ciples as follows: 
[T]he factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include (a) the needs of 
the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the 
relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the 
determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the 
basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uni-
formity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be ap-
plied. 
Id. § 6(2). 
 191.  For tort issues, the “[c]ontacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to 
determine the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the 
place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place 
of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if 
any, between the parties is centered.”  Id. § 145(2). 
 192.  As to contract issues, absent an ex ante choice made by the parties, “the contacts to be 
taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue in-
clude: (a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of per-
formance, (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the domicil, residence, na-
tionality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties.”  Id. § 188(2). 
 193.  Reynolds, supra note 176, at 1388. 
 194.  See id. at 1389 (“Judges love . . . [t]he Second Restatement [because it] permits them to 
rely on its eminent authority; yet it is flexible, guides decisions rather than controls them, and 
permits judges to avoid unjust results.”). 
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Third Restatement.  And the many pitfalls that inhere in any attempt to con-
struct a new, unified choice-of-law theory have led even some scholars to 
conclude that we ought to simply “leave bad enough alone.”195  Despite its 
shortcomings, then, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Second Restatement 
remains the most widely adopted choice-of-law methodology in the United 
States.196  Notably, however, it is used by only a plurality of jurisdictions,197 
leaving room for still more competing theories to be developed and adopt-
ed. 
Professor Robert Leflar, writing in the 1960s, proposed the “Leflar” or 
“better law” approach to choice-of-law analysis.198  Leflar contended that a 
set of five “choice-influencing considerations” should be used to decide 
among multiple competing laws.199  Included in Leflar’s considerations 
were maximizing predictability of results, maintaining interstate and inter-
national order, simplifying the judicial task, advancing the forum jurisdic-
tion’s own governmental interests, and—most famously—applying the 
“better” rule of law.200  The last consideration contemplates a sort of quali-
tative, normative inquiry that remains unique among choice-of-law rules.201  
Within the United States, five states have adopted the better-law approach 
for tort cases; two have done so for contract claims.202 
3.  Lex Fori: Choosing Not to Decide 
A handful of states have at some point formally adopted a form of the 
“lex fori”203 approach to choice of law.  Under this approach, courts gener-
                                                          
 195.  See, e.g., Gary J. Simson, Commentary, Leave Bad Enough Alone, 75 IND. L.J. 649, 651–
52 (2000) (“Whatever the shortcomings of the Second Restatement, I am persuaded that a third is 
almost certain to be worse.”). 
 196.  See Symeonides, supra note 177, at 309 tbl.1 (identifying twenty-eight states that apply 
some form of the Second Restatement in determining choice-of-law). 
 197.  See id. (noting that twenty-four states use the Second Restatement methodology for tort 
cases and twenty-three for contract cases). 
 198.  Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 267, 295–304 (1966). 
 199.  Id. at 282.   
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Cf. Carlos M. Vázquez, Customary International Law as U.S. Law: A Critique of the Re-
visionist and Intermediate Positions and a Defense of the Modern Position, 86 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1495, 1582–83 (2011) (“[The better-law] test differs from the others in that it openly re-
quires an evaluation of the substance of the contending laws.”). 
 202.  See Symeonides, supra note 177, at 309 tbl.1 (stating that only Arkansas, New Hamp-
shire, Rhode Island, Minnesota, and Wisconsin employ the better-law approach in tort cases; and 
only Minnesota and Wisconsin apply it in contract cases). 
 203.  Meaning, literally, “[t]he law of a forum.” 
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ally apply what amounts to a presumption in favor of applying the law of 
the forum.  Thus, for example, the Michigan Supreme Court has stated that 
“[it] will apply Michigan law unless a ‘rational reason’ to do so otherwise 
exists.”204  Michigan’s approach has been described as a “hybrid lex fori 
system,”205 one that “combines a presumption in favor of forum law with 
governmental interest analysis.”206  Kentucky, by way of contrast, once 
used a strict lex fori approach,207 but the current state of its law is somewhat 
less clear—it now purports to apply lex fori rules (the “any significant con-
tacts” test) in tort and the Second Restatement in contract disputes.208  Yet, 
the Supreme Court of Kentucky recently applied Second Restatement prin-
ciples in a tort action, reasoning that the specific choice-of-law issue at bar 
was evidentiary in nature and was therefore “neither a tort nor a contract is-
sue.”209 
Finally, Nevada courts at one time applied a version of the lex fori ap-
proach to conflicts of law in tort cases.  As the Nevada Supreme Court for-
mulated its (now-defunct) rule, “the law of the forum (the place where the 
action is brought) governs in a tort case, unless another state has an over-
whelming interest.”210  Nevada has since, however, formally adopted the 
Second Restatement approach.211  Today, only Kentucky and Michigan are 
identified as overtly using lex fori,212 though it appears in various lesser it-
erations in other jurisdictions.213 
4.  Moving Forward: Defining Normative Goals 
Cloud-computing markets are presently among the most dynamic mar-
kets across all industries.  The scope and speed of innovation in the cloud 
                                                          
 204.  Sutherland v. Kennington Truck Serv., Ltd., 562 N.W.2d 466, 471 (Mich. 1997). 
 205.  Ralph U. Whitten, U.S. Conflict-of-Laws Doctrine and Forum Shopping, International 
and Domestic (Revisited), 37 TEX. INT’L L.J. 559, 574 (2002). 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  See Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Ky. 1972) (“When the court has jurisdiction 
of the parties its primary responsibility is to follow its own substantive law.  The basic law is the 
law of the forum, which should not be displaced without valid reasons.”). 
 208.  Saleba v. Schrand, 300 S.W.3d 177, 181 (Ky. 2009). 
 209.  Id.; see also Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 2009: 
Twenty-Third Annual Survey, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 227, 291 (2010) (discussing Saleba). 
 210.  Motenko v. MGM Distrib., Inc., 921 P.2d 933, 935 (Nev. 1996), overruled by Gen. Mo-
tors Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 134 P.3d 111 (Nev. 2006). 
 211.  Gen. Motors Corp., 134 P.3d at 116 (“We take this opportunity to clarify Nevada’s 
choice-of-law jurisprudence and hold that the Second Restatement’s most significant relationship 
test governs choice-of-law issues in tort actions . . . .”). 
 212.  See Symeonides, supra note 177, at 309 tbl.1. 
 213.  See infra Part V.A.3. 
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has, thus far, been breathtaking.214  As discussed above, the transition to 
cloud computing as the dominant computing paradigm—while made possi-
ble by the buildup of robust Internet architecture, advances in data-center 
technology and design, and an array of other developments—represents an 
evolution into uncharted territory.215  And as such, the cloud also offers a 
tabula rasa, a clean slate, upon which jurisdiction and choice-of-law rules 
might be written so as to avoid the missteps courts have made when con-
fronted with the rise of the Internet. 
A robust and growing body of economic theory and empirical research 
demonstrates that the welfare gains from innovation—both in terms of con-
sumer and total welfare—far outweigh the gains from ensuring efficient 
static price competition,216 which had for decades been the focus of compe-
tition enforcement.217  Consequently, institutions in the United States and 
elsewhere have recognized that protecting innovation ought to be a primary 
goal of the law in legal fields such as competition (antitrust),218 intellectual 
property,219 privacy,220 telecommunications,221 and diverse other areas.222  
                                                          
 214.  See, e.g., Won Kim, Cloud Computing: Today and Tomorrow, 8 J. OBJECT TECH. 65, 
65–66 (2009) (discussing the advances in computing and information technologies that allow the 
computing field to envision a transition into the cloud computing era). 
 215.  See supra Parts II.B & II.C. 
 216.  See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 5 J. 
COMP. L. & ECON. 581, 603 (2009) (“Industry after industry can demonstrate gains from dynamic 
(innovation-driven) competition that overshadow the gains when competition is present but inno-
vation is absent.”); see Sanghoon Ahn, Competition, Innovation and Productivity Growth: A Re-
view of Theory and Evidence 19–20 (OECD Econ. Dep’t, Working Paper No. 317, 2002), availa-
ble at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.318059.   
 217.  This arguably misguided focus on “allocative” efficiency is generally associated with the 
Chicago School of Economics.  See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Unnatural Competition?: Applying 
the New Antitrust Learning to Foster Competition in the Local Exchange, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1479, 
1480 (1998-1999) (“[T]he model of neoclassical price theory as interpreted by the so-called Chi-
cago School[] incorporates a static view of competition and an exaggerated faith in entry and mar-
ket forces . . . .”). 
 218.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES 23–24 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf (devoting 
an entire subsection to “Innovation and Product Variety”). 
 219.  See, e.g., CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT 
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION (2011) (proposing various re-
forms to IP laws that would promote innovation). 
 220.  E.g., THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL 
ECONOMY (2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/privacy-final.pdf. 
 221.  See Bhagwat, supra note 217, at 1480. 
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Innovation-derived welfare gains have driven the rapid deployment and 
adoption of the cloud to date.223 
Given that cloud computing represents such an innovative, dynamic 
field, it lies at the core of these policy concerns.  And given that it consti-
tutes a relatively clean slate, it also represents a unique opportunity to im-
plement rules and methodologies that further these concerns.224  As a base-
line, any discussion of what normative goals jurisdiction and choice-of-law 
jurisprudence should seek to further in the context of cloud computing must 
include the promotion and protection of innovation. 
Much like the emergence of the Internet, the rise of cloud computing 
both informs, and is informed by, the broader trend of globalization—
political, social, legal, and economic cross-border interaction and integra-
tion—that has emerged as a master narrative in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries.  By allowing true location independence,225 cloud 
computing represents (as did the rise of ubiquitous Internet access) a para-
digm shift toward cosmopolitanism.226  And as a purely technical matter, 
cloud services would function best in a homogenized, borderless world.227  
Such a world would maximize cloud-sourcing efficiencies by allowing 
seamless workload migration around the globe.228 
Yet, as noted above, the challenge of globalization—in the realm of 
cloud computing no less than elsewhere—lies not in ignoring cultural dif-
ferences, but in simultaneously fostering cross-border interaction and re-
specting nonlocal structures and traditions.  The shift to the cloud is a shift 
toward consumption of computing as a service; it is consequently also a 
shift toward a contractual paradigm for interactions.229  Hence, the rate of 
adoption of cloud processes will depend (at least in part) upon the willing-
                                                          
 222.  See, e.g., Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1726, 1779 (2008) (“In addition to supporting voluntary obligations, [contract 
law] also . . . permit[s] and encourage[s] normative innovation . . . .”). 
 223.  See supra Part II.C (discussing the relative advantages of cloud computing over tradition-
al, localized computing). 
 224.  See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 225.  MELL & GRANCE, supra note 59; Bradshaw et al., supra note 68, at 5 (“Location inde-
pendence means, from the customer’s perspective, that the services can be accessed from any-
where with suitable communications links.”). 
 226.  Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 321–22 
(2002). 
 227.  See supra Part II.C.1. 
 228.  See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text (discussing the advantages of workload 
migration). 
 229.  See supra Part II.C.2. 
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ness and ability of parties to contract.  And as contract theorists have recog-
nized, maximizing trust and mutual respect and minimizing information 
asymmetries among parties (and potential parties) increases the number, 
scope, and efficiency of contract-based interactions.230 
Thus, personal jurisdiction and choice-of-law rules in the cloud can 
best serve the aims of fostering cross-border dealings, respecting unique 
structures and traditions, and promoting the dissemination of innovation by 
seeking to achieve three values.  First, personal jurisdiction and choice-of-
law approaches should function predictably, that is, in such a way that par-
ties can ex ante form reasonably educated guesses as to what forum is prop-
er for suit and what set of laws will apply to their interactions and order 
those interactions accordingly.  Second, and relatedly, personal jurisdiction 
and choice-of-law approaches should function in an open and transparent 
manner.  And third, personal jurisdiction and choice-of-law approaches 
should function objectively, that is, without unduly favoring either local 
parties over foreign parties, local law over foreign law, or plaintiffs over de-
fendants.  Such features can function to increase the trust and mutual re-
spect that are essential for coordinated social behavior,231 while decreasing 
inefficient information asymmetries. 
Drawing on these normative goals, Parts IV and V below set forth 
frameworks for analyzing personal jurisdiction and choice of law in the 
cloud.  First, these Parts analyze cases and decisions involving Internet dis-
putes and explain why the rules applied—either procedural or substantive—
are not only incongruous for cloud-computing cases, but also unworkable in 
practice.  These Parts then propose a series of rules and analytical structures 
better tailored to resolve these difficult, yet critically important, threshold 
questions in cloud-computing disputes. 
                                                          
 230.  See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal 
Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 762–63 (1992) (“Strategic bargaining under asymmet-
ric information creates the possibility of contractual inefficiency, . . . the revelation of information 
can . . . affect efficiency by changing how people bargain.”). 
 231.  Cf., e.g., Robert Cooter, Doing What You Say: Contracts and Economic Development, 59 
ALA. L. REV. 1107, 1109 (2008) (“To coordinate their behavior, people must say what they will 
do and do what they say.  Contractual commitment is the fundamental means for economic coor-
dination provided by law.  According to the contract principle for coordination, the law should 
enable people to commit to doing what they say.  When this principle is implemented, people can 
trust each other enough to work together . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
 2013]      PERSONAL JURISDICTION & CHOICE OF LAW 351 
IV.  PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN THE CLOUD 
The inherent technological nature of cloud computing beckons novel 
issues of personal jurisdiction.232  The fact that servers may be situated re-
motely in one location, accessed and manipulated from a second location, 
and utilized by third-parties in other, sometimes multiple, locations calls in-
to question where a defendant in a lawsuit arising from such a transaction 
will be subject to personal jurisdiction.  Certainly the defendant would be 
subject to personal jurisdiction in at least one of these locations, but which 
one(s)?  And if jurisdiction is proper where the servers are physically locat-
ed, what additional problems arise when the servers are mobile, as is the 
case with the marine-based server farms described in Google’s patent?233 
Before resolving these questions through a series of innovative pro-
posals, we first pick up where we left off at the end of Part III.A with the 
evolution of modern commerce via mass-communication means.  Part IV.A 
first examines personal-jurisdiction cases involving Internet transactions.  
Although likening the Internet to the cloud is not a strict apples-to-apples 
comparison,234 the Internet was both a precursor to the cloud and, arguably 
more importantly, makes large-scale cloud computing possible.  Thus, 
courts’ approaches to jurisdiction in Internet cases provide a useful founda-
tion for assessing similar issues that deal with cloud computing.  Part IV.B 
then explains why—despite the Internet’s close relationship with cloud 
computing—the Internet model is not a square-peg–square-hole fit for the 
cloud and why applying Internet personal-jurisdiction doctrines to cloud-
computing disputes could lead to undesired consequences.  Finally, Part 
IV.C sets forth a set of novel proposals for personal jurisdiction in the cloud 
and offers predictable and comprehensive solutions for courts and litigants 
to use in navigating these skies. 
A.  Lessons from Internet Personal-Jurisdiction Jurisprudence 
Prior to the dot-com boom of the 1990s, personal jurisdiction was tied 
almost exclusively to companies’ physical locations.235  But the advent of 
                                                          
 232.  See, e.g., Dykstra & Riehl, supra note 17, at 32 (“Determining jurisdiction in cloud-
computing environments is unlike any prior jurisdiction analysis.  Even more than websites, cloud 
computing is neither jurisdictional nor multi-jurisdictional.  It is non-jurisdictional in that physical 
geography frequently does not matter.”). 
 233.  See Swanson, supra note 13, at 713–14. 
 234.  See supra Parts II.B and C. 
 235.  Am. Bar Ass’n, Achieving Legal and Business Order in Cyberspace: A Report on Global 
Jurisdiction Issues Created by the Internet, 55 BUS. LAWYER 1801, 1922 (2000) (“[W]hen ques-
tions of jurisdiction arose in the pre-Internet world, a court could look to the location of the seller 
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the Internet transformed the conventional notion that businesses necessarily 
operate out of brick-and-mortar facilities.236  As globalization and the Inter-
net modernized commercial life, communication and transaction methods 
evolved as well—what we now refer to as “snail mail” yielded to email, and 
shopping (both for commodities and specialty items alike) in conventional 
four-wall stores gave way to online purchasing and auction websites such as 
eBay and Amazon.  Recall Justice Brennan’s portending statement from 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz that “it is an inescapable fact of modern 
commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely by 
mail and wire communications across state lines.”237  This doctrinal shift 
thrust courts into a modern-day “Wild West” for addressing questions of 
personal jurisdiction.238 
Fortunately, some early judicial decisions laid the groundwork for later 
courts charged with assessing whether personal jurisdiction was proper over 
an online-only defendant.  While the case law on this issue is already ro-
bust, we need only examine the primary approaches that gained traction and 
were broadly adopted before turning our attention to the applicability of 
these approaches in the cloud. 
1.  The Zippo Website Continuum 
The most prominent test for assessing personal jurisdiction over 
online-only defendants that emerged from early cases was the passive-
versus-active website test, haling from Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo 
Dot Com, Inc.239  In Zippo, the plaintiff, a Pennsylvania corporation that 
produced the well-known “Zippo” brand of lighters, sued the defendant, a 
California corporation, alleging cyber-squatting240 on the domain names 
                                                          
and the location of the buyer to determine if the court had, for personal jurisdiction, . . .  a nexus 
with the physical location of either the buyer or the seller.”). 
 236.  See CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996) (“The Internet 
represents perhaps the latest and greatest manifestation of . . . historical, globe-shrinking trends.  It 
enables anyone with the right equipment and knowledge . . . to operate an international business 
cheaply, and from a desktop.”). 
 237.  Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985). 
 238.  See Digital Equip. Corp. v. AltaVista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 463 (D. Mass. 1997) 
(noting how the parties “attempted to tame the ‘Wild West’ of the Internet”); Ann Davis, Tangled 
Web: How the Net Became Land of Opportunity for Legal Profession, WALL ST. J. EUROPE, Oct. 
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 239.  952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).  For a sense of just how novel the Internet was to 
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domain names, websites, and the World Wide Web.  Id. at 1121 n.1 & 2.   
 240.  For an explanation of cyber-squatting, see Jonathan H. Gatsik, Note, Cybersquatting: 
Identity Theft in Disguise, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 277, 289–90 (2001) (“Cybersquatting occurs 
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zippo.com, zippo.net, and zipponews.com.241  The defendant moved to dis-
miss for lack of personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania.242  The court found 
that the defendant did not have any offices, employees, or computer servers 
in Pennsylvania and that its contacts with Pennsylvania “occurred almost 
exclusively over the Internet.”243  Those Internet contacts in Pennsylvania 
included the defendant’s website, which offered a news service to end users 
who subscribed and paid with a credit card for membership; contracts with 
seven Internet-access providers in Pennsylvania to permit subscribers to ac-
cess the defendant’s news service; and approximately three thousand Penn-
sylvania residents who subscribed to the news service.244 
The Zippo court, in analyzing whether the exercise of personal juris-
diction over the defendant was proper, recognized that “the development of 
the law concerning the permissible scope of personal jurisdiction based on 
Internet use [was] in its infant stages,”245 and that the case law was 
“scant.”246  As a starting point, then, the court relied on traditional notions 
of personal jurisdiction from International Shoe and its progeny.247  The 
court proceeded to distinguish the facts before it from cases involving what 
it called merely “passive” websites, i.e., websites that simply post infor-
mation without allowing for user interaction,248 as well as “interactive” 
websites, i.e., websites that allow for user interaction but without conduct-
ing any commerce.249  In doing so, the court developed a continuum of what 
Internet activity on a website is sufficient to rise to the level of “minimum 
contacts” with the forum state such that jurisdiction is proper. 
The Zippo sliding scale is as follows: “At one end of the spectrum are 
situations where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet,” that 
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 241.  Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1121.   
 242.  Id. 
 243.  Id. 
 244.  Id. 
 245.  Id. at 1123. 
 246.  Id. at 1123–24. 
 247.  See id. at 1124 (“Traditionally, when an entity intentionally reaches beyond its bounda-
ries to conduct business with foreign residents, the exercise of specific jurisdiction is proper.  Dif-
ferent results should not be reached simply because business is conducted over the Internet.” (cit-
ing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985))). 
 248.  Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1125 (discussing and distinguishing Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruc-
tion Set, 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996), and Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 
295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). 
 249.  Id. at 1124–25 (discussing and distinguishing Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. 
Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996)). 
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is, “enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve 
the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the Inter-
net.”250  In situations like these, personal jurisdiction is proper because the 
defendant purposely avails itself of doing business in a given foreign juris-
diction.251  “At the opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply 
posted information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to users in 
foreign jurisdictions.  A passive Web site that does little more than make 
information available . . . is not grounds for the exercise of personal juris-
diction.”252  Finally, “[t]he middle ground is occupied by interactive Web 
sites where a user can exchange information with the host computer.  In 
these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the lev-
el of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information 
that occurs on the Web site.”253 
Ultimately, the Zippo court determined that personal jurisdiction was 
proper over the California defendant.254  The decision is an important one 
not for its result, however, but rather for its process.  Indeed, numerous cir-
cuit courts subsequently adopted Zippo’s passive-to-active website continu-
um for assessing personal jurisdiction.255  Yet Zippo also had its critics, as 
some courts criticized its sliding scale for being too narrow and inapposite 
to cases of general jurisdiction,256 and other courts viewed any specialized 
test for cases involving the Internet as being entirely unnecessary for engag-
ing in a jurisdictional analysis.257  Consequently, Zippo fell short of domi-
                                                          
 250.  Id. at 1124. 
 251.  Id. 
 252.  Id. 
 253.  Id. 
 254.  Id. at 1128. 
 255.  See, e.g., Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The 
opinion in Zippo . . . has become a seminal authority regarding personal jurisdiction based upon 
the operation of an Internet web site.”); see also Michael A. Geist, Toward Greater Certainty for 
Internet Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1367–71 & n.114 (2001) (collecting and 
discussing cases adopting Zippo). 
 256.  See, e.g., Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that the sliding scale 
“is not well adapted to the general jurisdiction inquiry, because even repeated contacts with forum 
residents by a foreign defendant may not constitute the requisite substantial, continuous and sys-
tematic contacts required for a finding of general personal jurisdiction”).   
 257.  See Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 510–11 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“‘Cy-
berspace . . . is not some mystical incantation capable of warding off the jurisdiction of courts 
built from bricks and mortar.  Just as our traditional notions of personal jurisdiction have proven 
adaptable to other changes in the national economy, so too are they adaptable to the transfor-
mations wrought by the Internet.”); see also TiTi Nguyen, A Survey of Personal Jurisdiction 
Based on Internet Activity: A Return to Tradition, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519, 539–42 (2004) 
(arguing that the Internet does not require any tailored test for assessing personal jurisdiction). 
 2013]      PERSONAL JURISDICTION & CHOICE OF LAW 355 
nating the field of Internet personal jurisdiction, and competing alternatives 
quickly arose in its wake. 
2.  The Calder “Effects” Test 
A second test employed in personal-jurisdiction cases involving the In-
ternet is the so-called “effects” test.  Unlike the Zippo continuum, howev-
er—which was created as a direct response to the advent of the Internet—
the effects test was fashioned prior to Internet litigation and was merely 
adapted to suit the technology of the times.  The effects test is rooted in the 
1984 U.S. Supreme Court decision Calder v. Jones.258  In Calder, a Cali-
fornia woman sued a Florida-based publication and a Florida reporter and 
Florida editor, in their individual capacities, alleging libel in a published ar-
ticle.259  The individual defendants argued that jurisdiction was not proper 
in California because to find otherwise would “in effect appoint the [article 
as their] agent for service of process.”260  Despite gravitating toward a simi-
lar argument in Volkswagen,261 the Court rejected this notion in Calder.  
The Court distinguished Volkswagen by noting that in Calder, the defend-
ants “expressly aimed” their actions at California by “edit[ing] an article 
that they knew would have a potentially devastating impact” on a California 
resident.262  The Court noted that although the journalists did not have any 
relevant physical contacts with the forum, “California [was] the focal point 
both of the story and of the harm suffered,” and jurisdiction was thus proper 
“based on the ‘effects’ of their Florida conduct in California.”263 
The Calder effects test was subsequently incorporated into jurispru-
dence dealing with online disputes.  In Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Com-
puter Corp., for example, a California court exercised jurisdiction over a 
North Carolina defendant under the effects theory for registering and oper-
ating websites with confusingly similar domain names and allegedly in-
fringing the plaintiff’s trademarks.264  The court determined that jurisdiction 
was proper, finding that “[t]he brunt of the harm was suffered in [Califor-
nia]” because the plaintiff was “based” there.265  Similarly, in Blakey v. 
Continental Airlines, Inc., the plaintiff sued in New Jersey state court for 
                                                          
 258.  465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
 259.  Id. at 784–86. 
 260.  Id. at 789 (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 261.  See supra text accompanying note 142. 
 262.  Calder, 465 U.S. at 789–90. 
 263.  Id. at 788–89. 
 264.  89 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1156–57 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
 265.  Id. at 1159–60. 
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defamation based on comments posted to an online discussion forum by de-
fendants, who were nonresidents of New Jersey.266  The court in Blakey 
found that jurisdiction was proper, reasoning that “[b]ecause defamation 
was alleged to be part of the harassing conduct that took place on the 
[online forum], it would be fair to posit jurisdiction where the effects of the 
harassment were expected or intended to be felt.”267 
Despite the effects test being technology-neutral on its face,268 some 
courts have viewed it in its purest form as being too plaintiff-friendly when 
applied to disputes involving Internet activity.  The Fourth Circuit has twice 
hinted at this conclusion,269 reasoning that the Internet is available in essen-
tially all jurisdictions and thus a defendant’s posting of information on a 
website—such as an allegedly defamatory article as in Calder—could have 
“effects” on potential plaintiffs everywhere.270  The effects test thus misses 
the mark in Internet disputes in that it fails to consider whether a defendant 
purposefully availed herself to a particular forum.271  Courts adopting the 
Calder approach for the Internet, then—rather than emphasizing the effects 
of a defendant’s actions—instead relied on the “expressly aimed” language 
in Calder and inquired as to the defendant’s intent to cause harm in the fo-
                                                          
 266.  751 A.2d 538, 555–56 (N.J. 2000). 
 267.  Id. at 556 (emphasis added). 
 268.  Compare Calder, 465 U.S. at 789–90 (print magazine), with Nissan, 89 F. Supp. 2d at 
1156–57 (Internet website), with Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd., 34 
F.3d 410, 411–12 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Calder and holding that a defendant “entered” the fo-
rum via television broadcast). 
 269.  See Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256, 262 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that 
“Calder does not sweep that broadly”); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consultants, Inc., 293 F.3d 
707, 714 (4th Cir. 2002) (“This standard for reconciling contacts through electronic media with 
standard due process principles is not dissimilar to that applied by the Supreme Court in Cal-
der . . . .  Analogously, under the standard we adopt and apply today, specific jurisdiction in the 
Internet context may be based only on an out-of-state person’s Internet activity directed at Mary-
land and causing injury that gives rise to a potential claim cognizable in Maryland.”). 
 270.  See ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 712–13 (“[T]he Internet is omnipresent—when a person plac-
es information on the Internet, he can communicate with persons in virtually every jurisdic-
tion . . . .  [I]t would be difficult to accept a structural arrangement in which each State has unlim-
ited judicial power over every citizen in each other State who uses the Internet.”). 
 271.  See Young, 315 F.3d at 263 (“Something more than posting and accessibility is needed to 
indicate that the [newspapers] purposefully (albeit electronically) directed [their] activity in a sub-
stantial way to the forum state. . . .  The newspapers must, through the Internet postings, manifest 
an intent to target and focus on Virginia readers.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)); 
ALS Scan, 293 F.3d at 712 (“If we were to conclude as a general principle that a person’s act of 
placing information on the Internet subjects that person to personal jurisdiction in each State in 
which the information is accessed, then the defense of personal jurisdiction, in the sense that a 
State has geographically limited judicial power, would no longer exist.”). 
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rum state.272  Or stated otherwise, and to borrow a phrase from the Supreme 
Court, courts asked whether the defendant “purposely avails” himself of the 
benefits of interacting with the forum state.273 
B.  The Internet’s Incongruence to the Cloud 
The Zippo and Calder tests emerged as the two primary methods for 
analyzing personal jurisdiction over Internet activities.274  And because the 
Internet is an important (and debatably the principal275) cog driving the 
cloud-computing engine, it might seem at first glance to logically follow 
that these tests are transferrable to resolve similar personal-jurisdiction is-
sues that arise in cloud-computing cases.  The nature of the cloud, however, 
poses barriers to such borrowing by courts. 
Unlike the Internet—which is arguably a software phenomenon (not-
withstanding its infrastructure considerations)—the holistic concept of 
cloud computing is based on storing data, which inherently relies on hard-
ware.276  Thus, while the Internet allows for interactivity over an essentially 
location-less medium, cloud computing is necessarily (and perhaps counter-
intuitively) “grounded” by aggregated servers on land or in water (as in the 
case of Google’s patent).277  Additionally, the Internet has a “face,” so to 
speak.  That is, most lawsuits involving information on the Internet concern 
users’ visual interaction with, and response to, web content.278  By contrast, 
                                                          
 272.  See e.g., Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321–22 (9th Cir. 1998) 
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 274.  See A. Benjamin Spencer, Jurisdiction and the Internet: Returning to Traditional Princi-
ples to Analyze Network-Mediated Contacts, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 72 (“In th[e] [Internet] 
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 275.  See Erica Naone, Computer in the Cloud: Online Desktop Systems Could Bridge the Dig-
ital Divide, MIT TECH. REV., Sept. 18, 2007, http://www.technologyreview.com/news/408689/ 
computer-in-the-cloud/ (describing cloud computing as “relying” on the Internet). 
 276.  See supra Part II.C.1. 
 277.  See supra Part II.C. 
 278.  See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1157 (C.D. 
Cal. 2000) (trademark claim based on defendant’s website that “displayed a ‘Nissan Computer’ 
logo that [was] allegedly confusingly similar to the plaintiffs’ ‘Nissan’ logo”); Blakey v. Cont’l 
Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538, 544 (N.J. 2000) (defendants “publish[ing] a series of what plaintiff 
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cloud-computing disputes often involve the “faceless” access to, and ma-
nipulation of, information by parties. 
To understand these critical distinctions, consider the following hypo-
thetical scenario.  A data thief in Illinois hacks into a remote, marine-based 
server located in the Caribbean Sea.  The server stores credit-card infor-
mation for numerous credit-lending companies.  The thief steals the credit-
card information of X, a resident of New York.  (We say “X,” as opposed to 
“victim” or “plaintiff,” to emphasize the idea that the data thief is unaware 
of the identity of this person—to the thief, X could be anyone, located any-
where, and exists merely as an alphanumeric string of characters in a data-
base file.)  X’s credit card draws on funds from a checking account with 
Bank of America, which is a Delaware corporation with its principal place 
of business in North Carolina. The thief then uses that credit card infor-
mation to make purchases from an online vendor in Europe.  Mapping how 
the two prominent Internet jurisdiction tests would apply to the circum-
stances set forth here demonstrates their unworkability in the cloud context. 
First, Zippo provides us with minimal, if any, guidance.  As we men-
tioned previously, the Zippo framework is tailored specifically to web-
sites.279  Thus, while it provides a useful tool when evaluating a defendant’s 
outward-facing activity online, it does very little when assessing jurisdic-
tion over a defendant (such as the data thief described above) whose pres-
ence was neither seen nor known by the plaintiff (X) until the harm was al-
ready inflicted.  In other words, in Zippo itself, and in all subsequent cases 
that adopted its framework and found personal jurisdiction to be proper, 
there was an online interaction between the plaintiff and defendant that var-
ied in some degree of commerciality.280  The crux of Zippo was simply a 
                                                          
view[ed] as harassing gender-based messages, some of which [plaintiff] alleges are false and de-
famatory”). 
 279.  See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 280.  Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo dot com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1125–26 (W.D. Pa. 1997) 
(finding that personal jurisdiction was appropriate because the defendant “contracted with approx-
imately 3,000 individuals and seven Internet access providers in [the forum state]”); see also, e.g., 
Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that per-
sonal jurisdiction was appropriate because the defendant “sold millions of dollars worth of prod-
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California consumers” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, 
Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 890–91 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding personal jurisdiction because “[t]he granting 
of passwords to Michigan residents as part of a contract for [defendant’s] services is an interactive 
usage showing that [defendant] has intentionally reached out to Michigan customers”); see also 
e.g., Cadle Co. v. Schlichtmann, 123 Fed. Appx. 675, 678–79 (6th Cir. 2005) (declining to find 
jurisdiction because plaintiff “ha[d] not alleged that any interaction or exchange of information 
occurred between [defendant] and Ohio residents via the website”); BroadVoice, Inc. v. TP Inno-
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matter of the extent to which that interaction was commercial or the defend-
ant targeted end users in the forum state.281 
In the cloud, however, torts do not have to occur through any sort of 
website-host-consumer interaction.  Oftentimes, as with our scenario above, 
the torts that give rise to a cause of action for the data owner are acts on the 
data or server itself.  Further, the data’s owner is not necessarily aware of 
the tortious act until, for example, she checks her credit-card statement.282  
In this way, cloud torts can be categorized as unilateral, that is, they require 
no affirmative act by the plaintiff and can be carried out unknowingly.  The 
very nature of the Zippo test, however, requires the plaintiff to commit 
some affirmative act (for example, registering to receive a newsletter) for 
there to be jurisdiction—defendant–operators of strictly passive websites do 
not satisfy the minimum criteria for a finding of personal jurisdiction.283  
Accordingly, the Zippo continuum is nontransferable to the cloud due to its 
technological narrowness, as well as because of the apples-to-oranges con-
trast of website torts versus cloud torts. 
Perhaps, then, the Calder effects test—which is broader than the Zippo 
test in that it is not technology-limited284—provides a solution.  Recall the 
contacts that we set forth above.285  Under Calder and courts’ modification 
of Calder for Internet cases, we must look to either the place where the ef-
fects of the tort are felt, or alternatively, where the defendant (the data thief) 
“expressly aimed” his actions.286  For jurisdictional purposes, we can im-
mediately eliminate Europe because that location is merely fortuitous in 
that the thief could have made a purchase anywhere once the information 
was stolen.  Delaware and North Carolina can also be eliminated—were X 
bringing an action for recovery of lost funds (which she could also do, but 
is not in this scenario), there might be an argument that because the bank is 
                                                          
vations, LLC, 733 F. Supp. 2d 219, 225 (D. Mass. 2010) (declining to find jurisdiction because 
defendant’s “website was neither of a commercial nature nor directed specifically to a Massachu-
setts audience”). 
 281.  See Zippo Mfg. Co., 952 F. Supp. at 1125–26. 
 282.  See, e.g., In re iPhone Application Litig., 844 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1048–49 (N.D. Cal. 
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 284.  See supra note 268 and accompanying text. 
 285.  See supra Part IV.A.2. 
 286.  See Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789–90 (1984). 
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said to “hold” X’s funds, the monies could be said to have been “located” in 
either Delaware or North Carolina at the time that the theft occurred, and 
thus the tort occurred in one of those two locations.  The bank, however, is 
not responsible for guarding X’s credit-card information, which is contract-
ed through a third party (for example, Visa or American Express). 
We are left, then, with New York, the Caribbean Sea, and Illinois.  
Under the traditional Calder test, personal jurisdiction would arguably be 
proper in New York, as that is the state where X likely discovered that her 
credit card had been used without authorization and the “effects” of the tort 
were felt.  But, query whether jurisdiction in New York would comport 
with International Shoe’s mandate of “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice”?287  Our data thief did nothing to reach out to New 
York, did not know X was a citizen of New York, and did not intend to 
harm X (at least individually, i.e., personally, as compared to other “face-
less” victims).  For all we know, our data thief relied on a complex comput-
er algorithm or random-number generator to pull X’s credit-card infor-
mation from among millions of others’ information in a database.  It is safe 
to say, then, that our hacker could not reasonably foresee being haled into 
court in New York based on actions performed from his computer in Illi-
nois.288 
Surely, then, jurisdiction is proper in Illinois.  To be sure, that is where 
our data thief is located and where he committed affirmative acts to further 
the tortious conduct.  But until now, we have assumed some importance to 
our data thief residing in Illinois.  In reality, though, Illinois is no more sig-
nificant, and no less fortuitous, than Europe—the location where the credit-
card information was subsequently used to make purchases.  To find juris-
diction proper in Illinois only, then, would seemingly permit wrongdoers to 
engage in a sort of quasi forum shopping by running their illicit activities 
from within jurisdictions that are defendant-friendly.  This result certainly 
was not intended. 
We are left with the international waters of the Caribbean Sea—the lo-
cation of the credit-card company’s servers.  Arguably, this is where the fi-
nal act of the tort (the hacking of the server) was committed.289  It might al-
                                                          
 287.  Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
 288.  That is, that X is a resident of New York provides our data thief with a mere “random” 
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so be true that several jurisdictions could claim to have an interest in adju-
dicating the lawsuit (including Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, which of 
course have their own U.S. district courts, but also other countries).  But X 
would be disadvantaged by being forced to bring suit in any of these juris-
dictions.  And for the same reasons that a data thief could not reasonably 
foresee being haled into court in New York, X would also likely have trou-
ble overcoming the jurisdictional threshold to adjudicate the lawsuit in a 
foreign country. 
Discussing one by one the locations with some nexus to our factual 
scenario above reveals that personal jurisdiction in cloud-computing dis-
putes presents complex issues.  Perhaps X would be able to defeat a motion 
to dismiss in any of these jurisdictions and, ideally, maintain suit in New 
York.  In fact, it is likely that jurisdiction is proper in more than one of the 
U.S. terra firma jurisdictions, i.e., not in the Caribbean.  But the result is in-
determinate based on the current rules and frameworks available, and thus 
more certainty is desirable.290  That is true for plaintiffs (who wish to know 
where to sue), as well as for defendants (who wish to know where they 
might be sued).  In the section below, we attempt to provide that desired 
predictability by offering a series of proposals for addressing personal ju-
risdiction in cloud-computing disputes. 
C.  Solutions for Personal Jurisdiction in the Cloud 
Before outlining what we propose to be workable solutions to the 
cloud-computing conundrum in personal jurisdiction, it is important to reit-
erate that our intent and goal is not to make something out of nothing.  In 
other words, we do not claim to take a situation where no U.S. jurisdiction 
is proper—that is, a foreign defendant acting on a foreign server steals a 
foreign plaintiff’s account information that draws funds from a foreign 
bank—and provide a panacea to magically land the defendant in a U.S. 
court.  Rather, we assume that jurisdiction is proper based on some U.S. 
contacts and that some forums are more favorable for a plaintiff than others.  
That is to say that we are concerned less with the result than with the pro-
cess. 
Applying this principle to the hypothetical discussed above, it is not 
our contention that the plaintiff, X, will not be able to overcome a motion to 
dismiss filed by the data thief.  Indeed, a court in New York (X’s state of 
residence and likely her first-choice forum) may very well find that it can 
maintain an action for invasion of privacy without violating the Illinois data 
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thief’s due-process rights.  But as discussed, the Zippo continuum is non-
transferable to the cloud-computing analysis because of its technology-
specific nature,291 and the Calder doctrine is likewise troublesome due to its 
focus on a connection between the plaintiff and defendant ex ante to the 
commission of the tort.292  While this will provide the data thief with little 
refuge on the merits of a privacy-invasion claim, it does have some teeth at 
the dismissal phase of a lawsuit. 
Taking these considerations into account, below are three frameworks 
for bringing certainty and predictability to personal-jurisdiction issues in 
cloud-computing disputes. 
1.  Caveat Maleficus Approach 
One solution to the cloud-computing conundrum in personal jurisdic-
tion is a caveat maleficus, or “wrongdoer beware,” approach.  This proposal 
perhaps best analogizes to the age-old “thin-skull” doctrine in tort law that 
is based on the principle that “you take your plaintiff as you find him.”293  
In the cloud, however, the saying might be aptly altered to be, “You take 
your plaintiff where you find him.” 
Because tortfeasors in the cloud often inflict harm on “faceless” plain-
tiffs,294 courts may run into trouble when dealing with jurisdictional issues.  
This is because it would be a stretch to say that a defendant “purposely 
availed” herself to a state’s jurisdiction or “expressly aimed” her actions at 
a particular plaintiff in a given state when the tortfeasor was ex ante blind to 
the victim of her tort.295  Even state long-arm statutes that provide for juris-
diction over foreign defendants may not be tailored to account for cloud 
torts performed on data that is located at a remote server.296 
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A solution to the conflict between logical locations for bringing suit 
and the constitutional barriers to doing so is for courts to adopt a caveat ma-
leficus approach.  Under this theory, jurisdiction would automatically—and 
only as a balancing mechanism—be proper in the plaintiff’s place of resi-
dence.  While this proposal might appear rigid and overly plaintiff-friendly, 
the very nature of torts in the cloud warrants its perceived harshness to de-
fendants.  Cloud torts that involve the hacking of remote servers to obtain 
information are complex and sophisticated.297  In other words, there are 
high intellectual barriers to entry for the illicit activities that occur in the 
cloud, and tortfeasors know and understand, technologically, what it is that 
they are doing when they access a server.  Suffice to say, this sort of cloud 
tort is a very intentional tort (at least in suits not against a provider, for ex-
ample in a lawsuit for negligent server security). 
Accordingly, when a cloud tortfeasor implements a computer algo-
rithm or runs a random number generator to obtain the credit-card infor-
mation or social security number of a random person in a database, it 
                                                          
personal jurisdiction over any non-domiciliary . . .  who in person or through an agent: 
1. transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or ser-
vices in the state; or 2. commits a tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of 
action for defamation of character arising from the act; or 3. commits a tortious act 
without the state causing injury to person or property within the state, except as to a 
cause of action for defamation of character arising from the act, if he (i) regularly does 
or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives 
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or 
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in the state and 
derives substantial revenue from interstate or international commerce; or 4. owns, uses 
or possesses any real property situated within the state. 
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (2003).  We can immediately eliminate the “transacts any business” and 
“owns, uses, or possesses any real property” options.  We can also comfortably eliminate the 
“commits a tortious act within the state” option.  The tort (in the hypothetical) occurs at the remote 
server where person X’s information is actually stolen.  Cf. Michael E. O’Neill, Old Crimes in 
New Bottles, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 245 (2000) (“The computer as the subject of a crime 
means that the computer is ‘the physical site of the crime, or the source of, or reason for, unique 
forms of asset loss.’” (quoting Laura J. Nicholson et al., Comment, Computer Crimes, 37 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 207, 211 (2000))).  Query how privacy could be invaded in a jurisdiction where the 
tortfeasor never enters—physically or otherwise—that jurisdiction.  Arguably, however, the data 
thief virtually “enters” the remote cloud server at its location in the Caribbean Sea.  That leaves us 
then with “commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or property within the 
state.”  The stolen property (the money from X’s bank account) is not “in” New York, however—
it is in either North Carolina or Delaware, where the bank is located.  The question before us, then, 
becomes whether the injury to X is commensurate with her residence, or with her person.  In other 
words, if X were on vacation in Virginia when the data thief hacked into the server and obtained 
her credit card information, would the tort then effectively occur in Virginia, as opposed to New 
York?  Certainly, X did not travel to Virginia and leave her privacy right behind in New York. 
 297.  Neal K. Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1075 (2001) 
(noting that “[c]ybercrime is . . . somewhat different from regular crime in that it initially requires 
sophistication and expertise”). 
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should come as no surprise to the tortfeasor that her victim is located in 
what would appear to be a random jurisdiction, that is, not the tortfeasor’s 
own state of residence.  To be sure, the very nature of the tort and level of 
sophistication required to commit it compels a quasi quid pro quo—where a 
tortfeasor indiscriminately targets a victim, justice requires the tortfeasor to 
defend a lawsuit in the victim’s equally “indiscriminate” home state. 
The caveat maleficus approach thus serves a three-fold purpose.  First, 
it may deter defendants from committing a cloud tort if they know that they 
will have to “take their plaintiff where they find him.”298  Second, and as a 
corollary, it effectively eliminates a defendant’s constitutional argument 
that she did not aim her actions at a given jurisdiction.  In other words, the 
“faceless” plaintiff is a double-edged sword for defendants—a defendant’s 
lack of knowledge about her plaintiff, it could be argued, imparts upon the 
defendant the awareness that she could be haled into court anywhere, and in 
essence aims her actions everywhere.299  Finally, the caveat maleficus ap-
proach serves the benefit of giving end users a greater proclivity to interact 
with software and programs in the cloud knowing that they have recourse 
for violations of their cloud privacy through their own local consumer-
protection laws, as opposed to those laws of a foreign jurisdiction (whether 
national or international).300 
2.  The Cloud as Its Own Jurisdiction 
A second possible solution for resolving the cloud-computing conun-
drum in personal jurisdiction is to simply rise above the world below and 
create a new jurisdiction for torts and crimes that occur in the cloud.  That 
is, we could consider the cloud as a separate and distinct jurisdiction of its 
own, free of physical geographic boundaries.  This structure might take a 
                                                          
 298.  See Daniel W. Shuman, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 115, 118–32 (1993) (advocating for deter-
rence as a goal of tort law); see also generally Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: 
Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997) (same). 
 299.  See Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 620 (E.D. Va. 2002) 
(“Defendants allegedly purposefully transmitted millions of UBE to Verizon’s e-mail servers.  
They cannot seek to escape answering for these actions by simply pleading ignorance as to where 
these se[r]vers were physically located.”); MaryCLE, LLC v. First Choice Internet, Inc., 890 A.2d 
818, 834 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (“[Defendant] cannot plead lack of purposeful availment be-
cause the ‘nature’ of the Internet does not allow it to know the geographic location of its email 
recipients.”); see also Grantz, supra note 295, at 1152–56 (discussing cases where the defendant 
was unaware of the plaintiff’s location but was nevertheless subject to jurisdiction). 
 300.  Cf. Geist, supra note 255, at 1347 (“Consumers anxious to purchase online must also bal-
ance the promise of unlimited choice, greater access to information, and a more competitive glob-
al marketplace with the fact that they may not benefit from the security normally afforded by local 
consumer protection laws.”). 
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form analogous to that of the Court of Federal Claims, which is the exclu-
sive court for, inter alia, patent-infringement lawsuits against the govern-
ment, and similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which is 
the exclusive jurisdiction for all patent-related appeals.301  Indeed, a similar 
scheme for handling disputes regarding the Internet was previously advo-
cated by David Johnson, Co-Director of the Cyberspace Law Institute, and 
Professor David Post.302 
In their 1996 article discussing law in cyberspace, Johnson and Post 
argue that “[t]reating Cyberspace as a separate ‘space’ to which distinct 
laws apply should come naturally, . . . [because] the line that separates 
online transactions from our dealings in the real world is just as distinct as 
the physical boundaries between our territorial governments.”303  Addition-
ally, because the Internet is accessible globally, Johnson and Post urge that 
“[c]onceiving of the Net as a separate place for purposes of legal analysis 
will have great simplifying effects.”304  Moreover, a special jurisdiction for 
the Internet would put an end to local jurisdictions engaging in what the au-
thors refer to as an “illegitimate extra-territorial power grab.”305 
There is, perhaps, an even stronger argument that this proposal should 
gain traction for cloud computing more so than it has for the Internet.306  
That is because unlike Internet torts, cloud torts do not necessarily have a 
nexus to any physical location (even if cloud servers do).  Whether a court 
is addressing a defamation or trademark infringement claim, for example, 
Internet causes of action stem from effects that are felt in one or multiple 
geographic jurisdictions.  The Internet is thus merely a medium through 
which a tort is committed.307  The cloud, on the other hand, is a “location” 
itself where a tort is committed.308  For example, copyrighted information 
                                                          
 301.  As to the Court of Federal Claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2006); as to the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, see 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006). 
 302.  See generally David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in 
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996). 
 303.  Id. at 1379. 
 304.  Id. at 1380. 
 305.  Id. at 1380. 
 306.  See Rollo, supra note 155, at 693 (noting that “[t]o date, no court has adopted the Cyber-
space approach to the Internet.”). 
 307.  See Johnson & Post, supra note 302, at 1378 (“Traditional legal doctrine treats the Net as 
a mere transmission medium that facilitates the exchange of messages sent from one legally sig-
nificant geographical location to another, each of which has its own applicable laws.”). 
 308.  See Couillard, supra note 84, at 2237–38 (“[T]he [cloud] service provider has a copy of 
the keys to a user’s cloud ‘storage unit,’ much like a landlord or storage locker owner has keys to 
a tenant’s space, a bank has the keys to a safe deposit box, and a postal carrier has the keys to a 
mailbox.”). 
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can be accessed and replicated in the cloud, and the infringement occurs re-
gardless of whether the copyright owner in a specific geographic jurisdic-
tion recognizes the infringement. 
Accordingly, in much the same way that the complexities of patents 
gave birth to a specialized appeals court,309 a similar scheme may be the an-
swer to the complex jurisdictional fact patterns presented in cloud disputes.  
This scheme might also provide the benefits of eliminating forum shopping 
by plaintiffs as well as eliminating altogether defendants’ motions to dis-
miss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
3.  Legislative Action and a Regulatory Scheme 
Finally, updating current, or drafting entirely new, federal legislation 
may provide at least a partial answer to the jurisdictional conundrum.  The 
Stored Communication Act (“SCA”),310 for example, is the principal piece 
of legislation dealing with online privacy protections.311  As commentators 
have noted, however, “[w]hen Congress enacted this legislation in 1986, it 
likely never contemplated anything akin to modern cloud computing,”312 
and Congress “has not amended [the SCA] to address cloud computing.”313  
It is, therefore, time for comprehensive federal legislation that may solve 
the issue of where jurisdiction is proper in the cloud. 
The legislation that we propose would not itself designate the forum 
for bringing a lawsuit.  Rather, these new laws should better define the 
types of crimes and torts being committed in the cloud so as to nudge a 
plaintiff toward a particular forum.  Because questions regarding the actual 
location of a wrongful act tend to arise when dealing with complex cloud 
                                                          
 309.  See Damon C. Andrews, Promoting the Progress: Three Decades of Patent Jurispru-
dence in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 76 MO. L. REV. 839, 840–41 (2011) (noting 
the problems among regional circuit courts and at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office that 
spurred Congress to create the Federal Circuit). 
 310.  Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1860 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–11 
(2006)). 
 311.  Robison, supra note 5, at 1196; see also Nathaniel Gleicher, Neither a Customer Nor a 
Subscriber Be: Regulating the Release of User Information on the World Wide Web, 118 YALE 
L.J. 1945, 1945 (2009) (“Without the SCA to balance the interests of users, law enforcement, and 
private industry, communications will be subjected to a tug-of-war between the private companies 
that transmit them and the government agencies that seek to access them. Internet users will find 
themselves with little protection.”) 
 312.  Dystra & Riehl, supra note 17, at 11. 
 313.  Ilana R. Kattan, Note, Cloudy Privacy Protections: Why the Stored Communications Act 
Fails to Protect the Privacy of Communications Stored in the Cloud, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. 
L. 617, 645 (2011). 
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torts,314 a regulatory scheme tailored specifically to cloud computing would 
provide courts with clarity and guidance on what tort is being committed—
or in the case of a lawsuit by a consumer against a service provider, a con-
tract breach—and thus, where the tort (or breach) is being committed.  Ac-
cordingly, rather than relying on generic claims such as “invasion of priva-
cy” or “infringement,” courts would be provided with a framework for de-
determining where the wrongful acts occurred based on the plain text of 
statutes. 
Similar legislative overhauls can be seen in the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (“DMCA”)315 and the Communications Decency Act 
(“CDA”),316 which were enacted in response to changes in technology.317  
Both contain provisions that recognize the need for a balanced approach 
that provides certainty to stakeholders.  For example, “safe harbor” provi-
sions that protect service providers appear in both the DMCA318 and 
CDA.319  Congress could similarly revise the SCA, or draft entirely new 
comprehensive legislation, to provide increased uniformity for establishing 
personal jurisdiction in the cloud.  This latter option would, however—like 
any attempt to create a legislative magic bullet in the context of fast-moving 
and far-ranging innovation—likely be fraught with difficulties.  By way of 
analogy, the DMCA as a whole has been roundly criticized by copyright 
scholars, yet its safe-harbor provision has been largely heralded as a suc-
cess.320  Thus, it would appear, at least at this early stage, that a more selec-
tive, targeted approach is warranted. 
                                                          
 314.  See supra note 296 (discussing New York’s long-arm statute and the questionable juris-
diction in New York). 
 315.  Pub. L. No. 105–304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 
1201–05, 1301–32; 28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2006)). 
 316.  Pub. L. No. 104–104, 110 Stat. 133 (1996) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 230, 
560–61 (2006)). 
 317.  See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1) (2006) (“The rapidly developing array of Internet and other 
interactive computer services available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary ad-
vance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our citizens.”); id. §(b)(1) 
(“It is the policy of the United States to promote the continued development of the Internet . . . .”); 
David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 
673, 680–81 (2000) (“The millennial hope underlying the Digital Millennium Copyright Act [was] 
to bring U.S. copyright law ‘squarely into the digital age.’” (internal footnotes omitted)).  
 318.  17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006). 
 319.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006). 
 320.  See, e.g., Nicholas W. Bramble, Safe Harbors and the National Information Infrastruc-
ture, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 325, 333 (2013) (“‘[S]afe harbors’ [] have shielded intermediaries from 
secondary liability and thereby removed potential governmental and private constraints on the de-
velopment of new Internet services.”). 
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V.  CHOICE OF LAW IN THE CLOUD 
Litigation arising out of the cloud will frequently present multijurisdic-
tional fact patterns.  Workload migration321 and redundancy,322 as well as 
location independence, tend to increase the geographic scope of cloud-
based interactions.323  Consequently, such litigation will often raise com-
plex choice-of-law questions.324 
En route to identifying a set of analytical guidelines for choice of law 
in the cloud, we turn first to an examination of Internet choice-of-law juris-
prudence.  Though the Internet and cloud computing are imperfect analogs, 
the two do present some similarities.  As with cloud-computing interac-
tions, Internet-based interactions can involve some sense of “location inde-
pendence” and a broad-ranging geographic sphere of influence.325  “Indeed, 
the Internet ‘negates geometry . . . it is fundamentally and profoundly anti-
spatial.’”326  Like cloud computing, the development and adoption of the 
Internet (1) introduced an element of intangibility into human interactions 
and (2) represents a technological paradigm shift that both informs, and is 
informed by, globalization and the accompanying increase in cosmopolitan-
ism.  The similarities between the two allow lessons for the cloud to be 
gleaned from an analysis of how choice-of-law principles have evolved (or 
failed to evolve) to account for the advent of the Internet. 
A.  Lessons from Internet Choice-of-Law Jurisprudence 
A debate currently persists among legal scholars as to whether the 
choice-of-law approaches outlined above327 are sufficiently robust to allow 
                                                          
 321.  See supra text accompanying notes 63–64. 
 322.  See Timothy J. Calloway, Note, Cloud Computing, Clickwrap Agreements, and Limita-
tion on Liability Causes: A Perfect Storm?, 11 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 163, 170 n.41 (2012) 
(“Most Cloud services maintain data in up to three separate locations. This is an excellent redun-
dancy, should there be an [I]nternet outage or data center disaster. The data is readily available 
from the other Cloud locations without an interruption in service.”) (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 323.  See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text. 
 324.  See, e.g., Alberto G. Araiza, Note, Electronic Discovery in the Cloud, 2011 DUKE L. & 
TECH. REV. 8, at *12 (“For example, the data in data centers may be subject to foreign laws or no 
laws at all.”).   
 325.  MELL & GRANCE, supra note 59. 
 326.  ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 169 (3d Cir. 2000) (alteration in original) (citation omit-
ted). 
 327.  See supra Parts III.B.1–3. 
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adjudication of cases involving Internet-based interactions.328  On the one 
hand, the Internet clearly represents a dramatic shift in the way humans in-
teract with one another,329 and the contacts relevant to the choice-of-law 
analyses that predated the Internet can be much more geographically com-
plex than those presented by real-world interactions.330  What is more, some 
scholars have pointed out that the territorial-based conception of states and 
nation–states may be quickly becoming archaic in an increasingly connect-
ed world,331 calling into question the validity of choice-of-law methodolo-
gies that were developed in the Pre-Network Era.332  Some have gone so far 
as to posit that “[n]o physical jurisdiction has a more compelling claim than 
any other to subject [Internet-based] events exclusively to its laws.”333 
Even in the face of these difficulties, however, “U.S. courts have . . . 
applied standard choice-of-law methodology—the Restatement (Second) of 
Conflict of Laws, Governmental Interest Analysis, and the like—in 
[I]nternet disputes involving multiple states of the United States and foreign 
countries.”334  Remaining is the question of how they have done so—that is, 
the extent to and manner in which courts have applied those standard meth-
odologies in the context of the Internet.  The following Subparts explore 
three archetypal choice-of-law decisions involving Internet contacts. 
1.  GlobalSantaFe Corp. v. GlobalSantaFe.com335 
The GlobalSantaFe Corp. litigation involved a relatively “straightfor-
ward” set of facts (at least for an international conflict-of-laws case).336  
                                                          
 328.  See, e.g., Laura E. Little, Internet Choice-of-Law Governance, Temple University Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series No. 2012-20, at 4 (June 7, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2045070  (“The decision not to lead choice-
of-law students through a separate study of internet issues reflects the decision that existing legal 
paradigms are sufficient to handle internet conflicts issues.  This is not, however, the exclusive 
position among U.S. choice-of-law scholars.”). 
 329.  See supra Part II.B. 
 330.  See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 331.  See, e.g., Berman, supra note 226, at 320 (“Indeed, even a cursory examination reveals 
that our current territorially based rules for jurisdiction (and conflict of laws) were developed in an 
era when physical geography was more meaningful than it is today and during a brief historical 
moment when the ideas of nation and state were being joined by a hyphen to create an historically 
contingent Westphalian order.”). 
 332.  See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, Towards a Cosmopolitan Vision of Conflict of Laws: Rede-
fining Governmental Interests in a Global Era, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1819, 1821 (2005) (applying a 
“cosmopolitan pluralist” approach to Internet-based choice-of-law issues). 
 333.  Johnson & Post, supra note 302, at 1376. 
 334.  Little, supra note 328, at 4. 
 335.  250 F. Supp. 2d 610 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
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Two offshore drilling firms, Global Marine and Santa Fe, announced in 
September 2001 that they intended to merge into the GlobalSantaFe Corpo-
ration.337  Within twenty-four hours, Jongsun Ha Park, a Korean citizen, 
used a Korean registrar to register the Internet domain name “global-
santafe.com.”338  Park did not immediately post any substantive content to 
the globalsantafe.com website, a fact that—when coupled with the suspi-
cious timing of the domain name registration—seemed to indicate that he 
intended to engage in “cybersquatting,”339 a potential violation of U.S. 
law.340  Despite a final judgment from a U.S. district court ordering the Ko-
rean registrar to transfer the domain name to GlobalSantaFe, Park next ob-
tained a provisional injunction in a Korean court prohibiting the registrar 
from doing so on the theory that the U.S. district court lacked jurisdiction 
over the Korean registrar.341  As a result, GlobalSantaFe requested and ob-
tained a second judgment from the U.S. district court that again directed the 
transfer of the domain name.342 
The Globalsantafe Corp. opinions addressed questions of jurisdiction 
and recognition of judgments rather than pure choice of law.  Viewed 
through those lenses, the U.S. court’s decisions were fairly straightforward 
applications of existing law—that is, of the law of the United States.  Hav-
ing decided that jurisdiction lay in the Eastern District of Virginia, and that 
the U.S. Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”)343 forbade 
the Korean parties’ actions, all that remained in the court’s view was to en-
sure that comity concerns did not require deference to the Korean court’s 
order.344  Put simply, the U.S. court skipped from the question of whether it 
                                                          
 336.  Id. at 612. 
 337.  Id. at 612–13. 
 338.  Id.  Park then transferred ownership of the domain name to the Fanmore Corporation, a 
Korean firm.  Id. at 613. 
 339.  See Gatsik, supra note 240. 
 340.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i)–(ii) (2006). 
 341.  GlobalSantaFe Corp., 250 F. Supp. 2d at 614. 
 342.  GlobalSantaFe also successfully directed VeriSign (the top-level domain name registry) 
to cancel the domain name until the Korean registrar transferred it to GlobalSantaFe.  See id. at 
614, 626–27. 
 343.  Pub. L. No. 106–113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1536, 1501A–545 (1999) (codified 
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 8131). 
 344.  See GlobalSantaFe Corp., 250 F. Supp. 2d at 614 (“In addition to meeting these jurisdic-
tional requirements, GlobalSantaFe must also show . . . that it is entitled to relief under the 
ACPA, . . . and . . . that concerns of international comity do not preclude such a remedy in the face 
of the Korean court’s injunction.”).  The U.S. court, applying U.S. law, held that the “first-in-
time” rule, along with the fact that the “Korean proceeding was obviously begun with the intent of 
blocking the Judgment Order,” did not require deference to comity concerns.  Id. at 624–25 (citing 
Princess Lida of Thurn & Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 465–66 (1939)). 
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could hear the case to the question of whether the ACPA had been violated.  
The choice-of-law question, that is, the question of whether the ACPA 
ought to be the law that governed the parties’ actions, was simply ignored. 
2.  Mzamane v. Winfrey345 
By her own estimation, in 2007, Oprah Winfrey was the third most 
powerful media figure in the world (behind only Barack and Michelle 
Obama).346  Yet such power can be a double-edged sword.  The sphere of 
Oprah Winfrey’s influence, coupled with the globalized nature of Internet 
communications, led to a defamation suit being filed against her in connec-
tion with alleged sexual abuses at a South African school that she found-
ed.347  When scandal erupted at the Oprah Winfrey Leadership Academy for 
Girls (“Winfrey Academy”) in September 2007, Winfrey swiftly placed the 
headmistress of the school, Lerato Nomvuyo Mzamane, on administrative 
leave.348  Several of Winfrey’s subsequent statements to the press regarding 
the situation—which were ultimately disseminated globally via the Inter-
net349—spurred Ms. Mzamane to sue Winfrey in Pennsylvania state 
court.350 
Mzamane v. Winfrey yielded a broad swath of geographic contacts.  
The plaintiff, Mzamane, was born in Lesotho, matriculated in Nigeria, 
Vermont, and New York, and had been employed in Pennsylvania for the 
six years that preceded her one-year stint at the Winfrey Academy in South 
Africa.351  The defendant, Winfrey, was at all times domiciled in Illinois, 
and her allegedly defamatory statements were made in that state.352  Finally, 
as they had been published online, Winfrey’s public declarations reached 
nearly everywhere, including South Africa (the locus of the scandal that 
prompted the statements).353 
                                                          
 345.  693 F. Supp. 2d 442 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
 346.  Eamon McNiff, Judge Rules Oprah Winfrey Can Be Sued for Defamation, ABC NEWS, 
Mar. 18, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/oprah-sued-defamation/ 
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 347.  See Mzamane, 693 F. Supp. 2d at 464–65. 
 348.  Id. at 464. 
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Press Conference were available on the internet, and therefore, were published throughout the 
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 351.  Id. at 461–62. 
 352.  Id. at 462. 
 353.  Id. at 462, 471. 
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On these facts, the case presented a fairly knotty choice-of-law issue.  
After Winfrey removed the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdic-
tion, the court was bound to apply the choice-of-law methodology of Penn-
sylvania (the state in which the court was located), which had adopted the 
Second Restatement approach.354  The three most connected jurisdictions 
were Illinois, Pennsylvania, and South Africa.  And while it is perhaps un-
surprising that South African law may have yielded a different outcome 
than U.S. law,355 even the choice between Illinois and Pennsylvania laws 
could have been outcome-determinative.356  Oddly, however, given its 
plaintiff-friendly nature, “neither party raised the applicability of South Af-
rican law to Plaintiff’s claims.  Rather, both parties argued vigorously 
against the application of South African law to the instant dispute.”357 
An easy alternative had thus presented itself to the U.S. district court: 
ignore the possibility that South African law ought to apply, given that nei-
ther party had argued in favor of its application.  What is more, the court 
was under no duty to inquire, sua sponte, as to such a possibility.358  After 
concluding that Pennsylvania (the state of Mzamane’s domicile) had a 
stronger interest than Illinois in having its law apply to the case, however, 
the court went on to examine in some detail the question of whether South 
Africa’s interest in protecting Mzamane’s reputation militated in favor of 
South African law applying.359  And though the court ultimately concluded 
that Pennsylvania’s law ought to apply, its decision was clear, its rationale 
transparent, and its result relatively predictable. 
                                                          
 354.  Id. at 469–71. 
 355.  Id. at 473 (finding that a true conflict existed where South African law required defend-
ants to prove truth as a defense to a defamation claim, while Pennsylvania law required plaintiffs 
in such cases to prove falsity as part of their affirmative case). 
 356.  See Neil M. Rosenbaum, Pick a Court, Any Court: Forum Shopping Defamation Claims 
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3.  CRS Recovery, Inc. v. Laxton360 
The Internet domain name “rl.com,” registered in 1995 by Dale May-
berry, proved valuable enough to incite multiple lawsuits, including one 
brought by global clothing giant Ralph Lauren.  Mayberry, a Virginia resi-
dent, registered the name under a contract with a Delaware registrar whose 
principal place of business was also in Virginia.361  Mayberry periodically 
renewed the domain-name registration, though there was some dispute as to 
whether he subsequently “abandoned” the registration by letting it expire.362 
In December 2003, a Beijing resident named Li Qiang gained control 
of rl.com and transferred it to Barnali Kalita, a citizen of India.363  Subse-
quently, Kalita sold the name to John Laxton, a citizen of California.364  
Upon discovering that Laxton controlled rl.com, Mayberry filed a lawsuit in 
a federal district court in California, alleging conversion, interference with 
contracts, and unfair competition.365 
The district court, having decided that the primary issue was one of 
choice of law and that California law ought to apply, granted summary 
judgment in favor of Mayberry on his conversion claims and ordered Lax-
ton to turn over rl.com to Mayberry.366  Laxton appealed to the Ninth Cir-
cuit.367  On appeal, the primary issue was again choice of law—Laxton (the 
California defendant) contended that Virginia law ought to apply, while 
Mayberry (the Virginia plaintiff) argued in favor of California law.368 
As the Ninth Circuit observed, “[t]his case requires application of tra-
ditional choice-of-law . . . principles to an increasingly common factual set-
ting, a dispute over the ownership of an Internet domain name.”369  Califor-
nia had “specifically rejected” the First Restatement approach in favor of 
“‘governmental-interest’ analysis,” with the “comparative impairment” 
                                                          
 360.  600 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 361.  Id. at 1140. 
 362.  Id. 
 363.  Id. at 1140–41. 
 364.  Id. at 1141. 
 365.  See CRS Recovery, Inc. v. Laxton, No. C 06-7093 CW, 2008 WL 4427944, at *1–2 
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 368.  Id. at 1141.  
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method used to adjudicate true conflicts.370  Yet California also incorpo-
rated a strain of the lex fori methodology—the court emphasized that “[a]s a 
default, the law of the forum state will be invoked, and the burden is with 
the proponent of foreign law to show that the foreign rule of decision will 
further the interests of that state.”371 
The first question to be resolved in governmental-interest analysis—
whether the potentially applicable laws actually differ372—posed some dif-
ficulty.  “Like the majority of states to have addressed the issue, California 
law recognize[d] a property interest in domain names,”373 which meant that 
domain names could be subject to conversion under California law.  The 
Virginia Supreme Court, on the other hand, had held—albeit in the context 
of a garnishment case—that domain names comprise contract (not property) 
rights.374  Despite this, the Ninth Circuit found that no conflict existed, rest-
ing its reasoning on two grounds.  First, given the “majority of states’ justi-
fiable coalescence” around the property-rights rule, the court found it rea-
sonable to adopt a “narrow” reading of the Virginia Supreme Court 
decision.375  And second, the fact that California treated domain names dif-
ferently than other intangible property for purposes of judgment debtor ex-
aminations allowed the “reasonable” inference that Virginia “might” do the 
same.376  California’s “default-to-forum” rule thus dictated that California 
law ought to apply.377 
Despite this holding, however, the court went on to address the second 
step of interest analysis: whether (assuming a conflict exists), the conflict is 
“true” or “false,” a conflict being false where only one jurisdiction has any 
real interest in having its laws apply to the facts at hand.378  Here, the court 
characterized the Virginia interest as follows: “Virginia is concerned with 
                                                          
 370.  Id. at 1141–42.  The comparative-impairment solution to Currie’s “true conflicts” prob-
lem was developed by Professor William Baxter in the 1960s.  See Baxter, supra note 182, at 8–9. 
 371.  CRS Recovery, Inc., 600 F.3d at 1142 (quoting Hurtado v. Superior Ct., 522 P.2d 666, 
670 (Cal. 1974) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 372.  Id. (citing Abogados v. AT & T, Inc., 223 F.3d 932, 934 (9th Cir. 2000)). 
 373.  Id. at 1142. 
 374.  See Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int’l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80, 88 (Va. 2000) (finding 
that, in the context of a garnishment case, domain names are governed by contract law). 
 375.  CRS Recovery, Inc., 600 F.3d at 1143. 
 376.  Id. 
 377.  See id. (“Under California choice-of-law rules, the party seeking application of foreign 
law bears the burden to show that the law of a foreign state should apply.  At the point Laxton 
fails to make this showing, we default to forum (California) law.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 378.  See supra Part III.B.2; see also Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in 
Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227, 253–55 (1958) (referring to “false problems”). 
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protecting Virginia residents who purchase domain names from property 
claims, not from asserting property claims.”379  California’s interests, on the 
other hand, were painted with broad strokes—“to protect the intangible 
property rights of the owners of domain names,”380 to reduce uncertainty 
and encourage investment, and to “promot[e] the overall growth of the In-
ternet.”381  In sum, the Ninth Circuit found that “California’s policy . . . is 
thus accurately characterized as protecting the rightful holders of domain 
names, [and] encouraging investment in and development of that proper-
ty.”382  What is more, the court reasoned, “when the defendant is a resident 
of California and the tortious conduct . . . occurs [in California], Califor-
nia’s deterrent policy of full compensation is clearly advanced by applica-
tion of its own law.”383 
Finally, the court concluded its choice-of-law analysis on an emphatic 
note: 
 Holding otherwise would encourage a race to the bottom, al-
lowing purchasers of potentially disputed domain names, as well 
as cybersquatters, to reside or operate in states where intangible 
property is provided little or no protection from potentially tor-
tious conversion.  Such a situation could vitiate the intangible 
property rights of the true holders of such property not-
withstanding states’ well-intentioned efforts to protect these intel-
lectual property interests.384 
By delving into the qualitative “value” of the two jurisdictions’ laws, this 
parade-of-horribles argument employed a methodology akin to the “better 
law” approach urged by Professor Leflar.385 
On four counts, the CRS Recovery, Inc. opinion demonstrates a local-
minded train of choice-of-law methodology and analysis referred to as “pa-
rochialism.”386  First, as a structural matter, the lex fori strain contained 
                                                          
 379.  CRS Recovery, Inc., 600 F.3d at 1143. 
 380.  Id. at 1144. 
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 383.  Id. (quoting Hurtado v. Superior Ct., 522 P.2d 666, 672 (Cal. 1974) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 384.  Id. 
 385.  See supra notes 198–202 and accompanying text. 
 386.  Mathias Reimann, Parochialism in American Conflicts Law, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 369, 370 
(2001).  Emphasizing the problem of parochialism, Professor Reimann noted that parochialism 
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within California’s choice-of-law rules387 displays an obvious geographic 
self-favoritism.  Of course, bound as it was to apply California’s chosen ap-
proach, the court can hardly be blamed for operating within such a struc-
ture.  Yet the structure itself appears increasingly outmoded in an era of 
globalization and digital connectivity, and (as we argue infra) its shortcom-
ings will be exacerbated should it creep into the cloud.388 
Second, the decision evidenced the opposite of the cultural relativism 
more appropriate to an increasingly cosmopolitan world and the multistate 
and multinational fact patterns that have already begun to emerge in cloud-
based litigation.  By presuming to determine the content of foreign laws by 
reasoning that the foreign jurisdiction would likely treat legal issues as the 
forum jurisdiction had done, the CRS Recovery, Inc. court committed the 
error of judging another culture from within the confines of one’s own local 
tradition.  Granted, the probability of “Type II” error389 from doing so was 
likely relatively low where the two jurisdictions were both U.S. states.  But 
where the foreign jurisdiction is a foreign nation, and particularly a non-
Western nation, the likelihood of such error would likely increase. 
Third, in characterizing the relevant state interests as it did, the court 
engaged in a parochialist sleight-of-hand.  By defining the foreign jurisdic-
tion’s interests at a low level of abstraction—and assuming the sole purpose 
of Virginia’s treating domain name rights as contract rights was to guard its 
own citizens against property claims—the court essentially minimized the 
scope of relevant foreign interests.  And that, in turn, had the effect of fa-
voring the application of local (forum) law.  Tellingly, the court also ob-
served that California’s full-compensation rule would be furthered where 
the defendant was a California resident.390  Thus, it reasoned that the forum 
jurisdiction had an interest in compensating nonlocal plaintiffs—yet the 
court had already characterized Virginia’s interest as protecting only Vir-
ginia (i.e., local) residents.391  Ascribing a nonlocalized interest to the fo-
rum state, but a merely local interest to the foreign state, had the perverse 
consequence of further favoring local law. 
                                                          
 387.  See supra Part III.B.3. 
 388.  See infra Part V.A.2. 
 389.  A “Type II error” consists of failing to reject a false null hypothesis.  In this context, the 
court’s null hypothesis was that foreign law was structured similarly to local law; thus, a Type II 
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 390.  CRS Recovery, Inc. v. Laxton, 600 F.3d 1138, 1144 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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 2013]      PERSONAL JURISDICTION & CHOICE OF LAW 377 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s parade-of-horribles argument, though 
based on a putatively qualitative analysis of the conflicting laws, exhibited 
a logical and parochialist fallacy.  The argument centered on the potentiality 
of cybersquatters locating themselves “in states where intangible property is 
provided little or no protection from potentially tortious conversion.”392  
Assuming that domain names constitute “intangible property,” however, 
begged the question by assuming away the unsettled inquiry at the very 
heart of the choice-of-law dispute—namely, whether domain names com-
prise property rights or contract rights.  The argument is circular.  And the 
circularity arose when the court implicitly (and parochially) assumed that 
California (local) law governed in the first instance.  Again, the effect of 
addressing the choice-of-law issue from within a framework that took for 
granted the applicability (and superiority) of local law was—
unsurprisingly—to favor local law and interests over those of the foreign 
jurisdiction. 
4.  Conclusions 
The preceding sections suggest that Internet choice-of-law jurispru-
dence has developed in scattershot fashion.  Methodologies, application, 
and the scope and breadth of analyses have varied widely.  The three cases 
discussed above construct a spectrum—from GlobalSantaFe, with its glar-
ing lack of analysis; to Mzamane, a relatively well-reasoned and balanced 
opinion; to CRS Recovery, Inc., with its various shades of parochialism and 
xenophobia. 
Unfortunately, to the extent scholars have identified any broader trends 
within this sphere, the tendency appears to be toward either simply ignoring 
choice-of-law questions or engaging in (at best) superficial inquiries.393  
The portrait drawn is one of a “curious tendency in [I]nternet cases: even 
though the disputes invariably possess significant multi-jurisdictional ele-
ments, courts often do not bother with traditional choice-of-law analy-
sis.”394  Put simply, courts have tended to ask only whether local law may 
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apply, not whether it should apply.395  This is the approach exemplified by 
GlobalSantaFe, on the far end of—or, arguably, even off—the choice-of-
law spectrum.396 
Even when courts have engaged in more extended discussions of 
choice-of-law questions in the online context, they often display surprising-
ly “regressive” attitudes.397  As the CRS Recovery, Inc. opinion amply 
demonstrates, opportunities to favor local interests over foreign ones 
abound within modern choice-of-law methodologies.  And this is true even 
within analytical structures that do not overtly tilt in favor of local interests; 
the lex fori approach (and its lesser strains that surface in, for example, Cal-
ifornia’s nominally interest-analysis based system398) is more obviously pa-
rochial. 
All of this is still more surprising—and disturbing—given the context 
in which this jurisprudence is occurring.  The Internet has itself been a dis-
ruptive technology, allowing instantaneous bridging between geographic 
areas once considered so remote as to be almost entirely unconnected.399  
What is more, both exogenously and endogenously to the rise of the Inter-
net, the world has become an increasingly globalized, cosmopolitan 
place.400  These developments require contemporary institutions and indi-
viduals to confront a thorny, and somewhat paradoxical, question: How can 
political, social, legal, and economic cross-border integration be accom-
plished while also respecting myriad unique cultural structures and identi-
ties?401 
There may well be no single, overarching answer to this question, and 
it is certainly not our aim to attempt to provide one here—not even one that 
could be compressed to fit the relatively narrow contours of choice of law 
in the cloud.  At a bare minimum, it should provoke little or no disagree-
ment to declare that the parochial approaches and artifices described above 
represent an inappropriately narrow-minded solution.  Beyond that, the 
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normative goals identified in Part III.C can serve as touchstones.  Thus, 
with reference to furthering those aims (and avoiding the repetition of past 
mistakes), we ultimately seek to identify not a single “magic bullet,” but ra-
ther parameters to help steer future choice-of-law analyses. 
B.  Analytical Guidelines for Choice of Law in the Cloud 
By applying the lessons to be learned from over a decade of Internet-
based choice-of-law jurisprudence to the analogous cloud computing con-
text, this Subpart provides a set of guideposts to inform future jurisprudence 
and scholarship.  Again, these comprise no panacea.  Presently unforeseea-
ble problems will undoubtedly arise as the digital world shifts increasingly 
into the cloud.  The principles encompassed in the following discussion, 
however, may ease the transition and allow the course of the law to avoid 
repeating the mistakes of the past. 
1.  Confronting Conflicts: The Pitfalls of the “Jurisdiction-Only” 
Solution 
None of the normative goals identified in Part III.C can be served by 
simply ignoring choice-of-law questions.  Yet, as seen in the Internet con-
text, courts confronted with complex, novel issues appear frequently to do 
just that.402  If the choice-of-law inquiry holds any value at all—and nearly 
two centuries of jurisprudence, civil law, and scholarship suggest that it 
does—then courts considering choice of law in litigation arising out of the 
cloud ought not follow this route, tempting though it may be.  Simply ask-
ing whether local law can apply is not enough, particularly given the in-
creasingly national and international nature of cloud computing.  Courts 
must “confront, instead of gloss[ing] over, the apparent conflict in values 
and acknowledge that a choice must be made and justified.”403 
What we refer to as the “jurisdiction-only” approach may be “predict-
able” in the sense that, once a complaint has been filed, parties are able to 
predict which law will apply ex post to their interactions (at least in cases 
where jurisdiction lies in the plaintiff’s chosen forum).  But it is not pre-
dictable in the ex ante sense, i.e., private parties cannot ex ante predict what 
set of laws will likely apply to their actions—and it is this latter sense of 
predictability that produces the efficiencies sought by modern choice-of-law 
rules.  Furthermore, this jurisdiction-only style of choice-of-law methodol-
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ogy—or, perhaps more accurately, lack of methodology—is clearly neither 
an open nor transparent mode of analysis.  And finally, it lacks objectivity, 
for it unduly favors plaintiffs by essentially allowing them to choose which 
(presumably plaintiff-friendly) law ought to apply by engaging in forum 
shopping.  To the extent that plaintiffs tend to file lawsuits in their local ju-
risdiction, this approach also functions in an unnecessarily parochial man-
ner. 
By reducing trust, signaling a xenophobic mindset, and increasing un-
certainty, each of these facets of the jurisdiction-only approach fail to fur-
ther—and actually undermine—the prosocial adoption of innovative cloud-
computing processes.  Again, courts in this context should not ask only 
whether forum law may apply, but should go on to ask whether local law 
ought to apply, keeping the traditional aims of choice-of-law rules—as well 
as the unique goals noted above—firmly in mind. 
2.  Leaving Lex Fori Behind 
Like the jurisdiction-only approach, the lex fori methodology is partic-
ularly unsuited to resolving cloud-based choice-of-law questions while also 
serving normative ends.  It is, to be sure, simple to apply—a feature that 
may explain its continued, albeit limited, use.404  Functionally, however, it 
is indistinguishable from a jurisdiction-only system: courts first analyze the 
question of jurisdiction, then simply apply local law.  It could be argued 
that lex fori does possess one advantage over the jurisdiction-only approach 
in that it is quite transparent, that is, lex fori courts openly favor local law 
over foreign law.  The expressive function of law, however—the reality that 
law affects social interactions not only by what it does, but by what it 
“says”405—causes this “advantage” to cut both ways.  By openly declaring 
parochial values, lex fori communicates a narrow-minded worldview even 
more effectively than jurisdiction-only decisions.  As a result, it may have 
the ironic effect of disadvantaging local institutions and individuals by dis-
couraging cross-border transactions and interactions that would benefit 
both, or all, parties involved, including local ones.  And aside from the 
transparency question, lex fori is deficient in the cloud context for the same 
reasons as the jurisdiction-only methodology. 
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3.  Cultural Relativism and the Content of Foreign Law 
Courts using one of the more process-based choice-of-law approach-
es—governmental interest analysis and its offshoots, better law, or (to an 
arguably lesser extent) the Second Restatement—necessarily engage in sub-
stantive and comparative analyses of forum law and the laws of one or more 
foreign jurisdictions.  When doing so in the context of cloud-based litiga-
tion, a paradigm of cultural relativism should inform their decisions.406 
“Cultural relativism,” a concept that arose first in the field of anthro-
pology, describes the concept “that civilization is not something absolute, 
but that it is relative, and that our ideas and conceptions are true only so far 
as our civilization goes.”407  Facilitating trust and reducing uncertainty in 
cross-border interactions requires a cultural-relativist framework, given that 
“moral rules and social institutions evidence an astonishing cultural and his-
torical variability.”408  In light of this, courts should not be confident that 
they can accurately assess the contours of foreign law by referring to the 
content of local law.  And as a result, should the parochial approach to de-
ciphering foreign law described above become one used in multijurisdic-
tional, cloud-based litigation, foreign parties will necessarily face more ex 
ante uncertainty when ordering their interactions with local parties.  Fur-
thermore, by communicating that local law provides the touchstone for ana-
lyzing the content of foreign law, this attitude (like lex fori) expresses a pa-
rochial message that may ultimately hinder the spread of innovation.  
Instead, courts ought to refer to foreign codes, common law, and regula-
tions—not local law—when attempting to discern the content of foreign 
law. 
4.  Ceteris Paribus Levels of Abstraction for Governmental Interests 
Choice-of-law rules that require characterization of governmental in-
terests, as seen above, present an opportunity for more subtle parochialism.  
Thus, careful ceteris paribus abstraction should become the norm in inter-
est-centric choice-of-law analyses.  “Ceteris paribus,” a Latin phrase at-
tributed to British economist Alfred Marshall and frequently translated as 
“all other things being equal,” is often used in economics literature to de-
scribe a relationship between two variables while holding all other possibly 
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confounding variables constant.409  We use it here to describe the manner in 
which courts ought to compare governmental interests in deciding choice-
of-law issues—the two interests ought to be compared “holding all else 
constant,” particularly the levels of abstraction used to define the relevant 
interests.  Doing so will foster transparency, predictability, objectivity, and 
innovation. 
The problem of defining one set of interests at a low level of abstrac-
tion while defining a more favored set of interests at a high level of abstrac-
tion is certainly not unique to the choice-of-law context.  Courts have re-
peatedly engaged in this practice.410  In a pair of factually similar freedom-
of-religion cases, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court defined the relevant 
governmental interests at very different levels of abstraction—yielding an 
outcome of unconstitutionality in one case and of constitutionality in the 
other.411  More recently, CRS Recovery, Inc. demonstrates the presence of 
this type of outcome-determinative abstracting in Internet-based choice-of-
law disputes, as well as the possibility that it could bleed into cloud-based 
litigation. 
Defining foreign jurisdictions’ interests at a lower level of abstraction 
than forum interests,412 or defining forum but not foreign law as encom-
passing nonlocal goals,413 is neither open nor transparent.  Instead, by pur-
porting to engage in a side-by-side, fair balancing of competing laws and 
interests, yet disproportionately favoring local law, outcome-determinative 
abstraction functions in a misleading, opaque manner.  Furthermore, this 
methodology yields outcomes that are frequently at odds with the outcome 
that would be expected, given the stated choice-of-law rules.  It thus hinders 
predictability.  Finally, placing a finger on the scale in favor of local law 
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both precludes objectivity and communicates parochial values.  The cumu-
lative result of these effects would be to chill the dissemination and adop-
tion of innovative cloud processes. 
5.  Cosmopolitanism and Circularity in Qualitative Comparisons 
In jurisdictions that overtly apply the “better law” approach (as well as 
in jurisdictions wherein courts nominally apply other rules while using a 
similar normative judgment as a “tiebreaker” or to buttress their conclu-
sions), special care will be required in addressing cloud-based choice-of-
law questions.  Choice of law necessarily recognizes that “[t]here is no 
‘view from nowhere’ that can be used to capture the legal essence of the in-
stitution or conflict in question.”414  Instead, courts must analyze the rele-
vant legal structures as laterally and discretely situated, yet concurrently in-
tertwined with the facts at hand.  To avoid blatant parochialism, courts 
engaging in a better-law judgment must avoid begging the question by con-
sciously or unconsciously analyzing the qualitative merits of foreign law 
from the perspective of a world in which local law already governs.415 
Here, cultural relativist—and, to some extent, feminist—critiques 
again offer valuable insight: courts ought to be wary of reflexive attitudes 
regarding the “other” or “immediate instincts about the cultural and legal 
facts.”416  The risk of failing to do so is especially acute where a foreign le-
gal structure is based in part on a U.S. model, which may lull courts into a 
false sense of confidence as to their understanding of the foreign law.417  
This form of question-begging yields outcomes that lack objectivity, ex-
press unseemly favoritism of local law as a result, and are unpredictable 
from foreign parties’ perspective.  In sum, courts adjudicating choice-of-
law issues in the cloud context would do well to adopt a more cosmopolitan 
approach that recognizes the lateral nature of local and foreign laws.418 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Society is well on its way toward ubiquitous deployment and adoption 
of cloud computing.  The legal field, however, currently lags behind these 
developments.  Unwieldy at best and unworkable at times, the current theo-
ries and rules governing jurisdictional and choice-of-law analyses are in 
dire need of updating.  While no single policy proposal could hope to serve 
as a panacea for each problem courts will face in this context, a careful se-
lection and application of the principles and reforms outlined above may 
help to avoid many of the mistakes made in the earlier environment of the 
Internet.  Even more importantly, the selected principles will guide the con-
tinued development of jurisdiction and choice of law in the cloud so as to 
promote the predictability, trust, and mutual respect that are essential to en-
suring the continued spread of innovation. 
